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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years the landscape of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence has changed dramatically. Landmark decisions such 
as Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, l and Good News Club v. Milford 
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Central School,2 have placed significant emphasis on the concept of 
neutrality, specifically formal neutrality.3 Yet what if neutrality 
under the Establishment Clause is a myth-an unattainable dream? 
This Article explores the implications of this question, suggests that 
the answer raises serious concerns about the Court's approach, and 
points toward an alternative way of addressing Establishment 
Clause issues. 
Interpreting the Establishment Clause has never been easy. 
There are many reasons for this, but a major factor is the 
interaction between the broad principles said to undergird the 
Establishment Clause and the myriad of factual contexts to which 
those principles must be applied .. One obvious concern is the failure 
of the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to agree on underlying 
principles" Justices have long had disagreements about the 
meaning of principles such as separation and neutrality even when 
they agree on which principles apply.5 Some of these disagreements 
2 533 u.s. 98 (2001). 
3 For an excellent discussion offormal neutrality, see Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and 
State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1961) (framing notion offormal neutrality 
and proposing its use in religion clause cases); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and 
Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990) (analyzing formal 
and substantive neutrality and rejecting formal neutrality). See also Daniel O. Conkle, The 
Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and 
an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 8-10 (2000) (discussing formal neutrality and trend 
toward its increased use by Court). As will be seen later in this Article, the current Court's 
notion offormal neutrality may be more formalistic than Professor Kurland's approach. See 
infra notes 38, 52-247 and accompanying text. 
4 See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the 
Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REv. 673, 680-700 (2002) (tracing history of Establishment 
Clause doctrine from 1947 to today and suggesting that underlying rationale has moved from 
one based on liberty to one based on equality); Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and 
Prospects orTests~ Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REv. 323,323-29,388-89 (1995) 
(documenting disagreements among Justices over tests to be applied to variety of situations 
under Religion Clauses); Leslie C. Griffin, Their Own Prepossessions: The Establishment 
Clause, 1999-2000, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 237, 237-39 (2001) (referring to "disarra~ in 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and "the intensity of disputes about religion" on current 
Court). 
5 Two stunning examples of these disagreements are Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U.S. 1 (1947), and Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). In Everson, both the majority and 
. the dissenting opinions agreed that separation was the appropriate underlying principle. 
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16; w.. at 19,28 (Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 29, 31-32 (Rutledge, 
J., dissenting). Yet, the opinions disagreed about how strict that principle is in the context 
of its application to the school transportation program at issue. Compare id. at 16-18 
(discussing separation and noting that wall between church and "state must be kept high and 
HeinOnline -- 38 Ga. L. Rev. 491 2003-2004
2004] ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND NEUTRALITY 491 
have been about the nature of the principles themselves, and others 
have been about their application to specific facts and contexts.s 
Scholars have had similar disagreements over the nature of broad 
principles such as neutrality and separation, as well as their 
application.7 In recent years the Supreme Court has moved toward 
the principle of neutrality-specifically, formal neutralityB-at least 
in cases of government aid to religious institutions,9 religious access 
to government property and funding,IO and of course in the Free 
Exercise Clause context. ll 
impreganable," but upholding New Jersey school transportation program), with id. at 44-58 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (agreeing separation is guiding principle, but arguing New Jersey 
school transportation program violated that principle). In Mitchell, both the plurality and 
dissent claimed to be using neutrality. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-12 (plurality opinion); id. at 
877 ·84 (Souter, J., dissenting). The plurality used a formalistic version of neutrality, and the 
dissent rejected this formalistic approach in favor of a form of substantive neutrality that is 
not necessarily the determinative principle in aid cases. Id. 
6 See, e.g., Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-12, 878-84 (disagreement between plurality and 
dissent over nature of neutrality and its application, and between plurality and concurrence 
over role of neutrality); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-18,49-58 (disagreement between majority and 
dissents about strictness of separation principle in its application to New Jersey school 
transportation policy in question). 
7 See generally infra notes 82-126 and accompanying text (discussion of various 
approaches to neutrality); infra notes 248-324 and accompanying text (discussing various 
principles that scholars have argued undergird Establishment Clause). 
8 The Court's recent decisions suggest that formal neutrality is the appropriate 
governing principle in a number of contexts. See infra notes 52-247 and accompanying text. 
o See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 670 (2002) (upholding voucher 
program based on facial neutrality of relevant law and fact that individual choice determined 
to which institutions voucher money flowed); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 793-95 (plurality opinion) 
(applying facial neutrality and upholding Chapter 2 of Title I of Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965, which provides federal funds to state and local governments that lend 
equipment and educational materials to public and private schools); Zobrest v. Catalina 
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. I, 13-14 (1993) (applying facial neutrality and upholding 
provision of sign language interpreter under Individuals with Disabilities Education Act). 
10 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001) (holding that 
it is unconstitutional to deny Christian group that engages in prayer and favors 
proselytization access to elementary school facilities outside of regular school hours if other 
non-school-sponsored student groups are given such access); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors 
ofUniv. of Va. , 515 U.S. 819,837,846 (1995) (holding that it is unconstitutioI;J,al for public 
university to deny funding to Christian student newspaper if similar funding is available to 
other student groups); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 
(1995) (holding that it is unconstitutional to deny Ku Klux Klan the right to place large cross 
in public forum maintained by state); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 
508 U.S. 384, 394-96 (1993) (holding that it is unconstitutional to deny church use of school 
building at night for purposes of showing religious fUm because other non-school related 
groups are allowed to use school building). 
11 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990) (holding there is 
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This Article asserts that neutrality, whether formal or 
substantive,12 does not exist. Other scholars have recognized this,13 
and still others suggest that the concept of neutrality is inherently 
dependent upon the baseline one chooses to use in describing it.14 
The nature of neutrality has always been problematic, but over the 
last three terms the Court has made neutrality a concept of singular 
importance, whereas earlier Courts had other principles driving 
their decisions. Most scholars who have discussed the problem 
generally no constitutional right under the Free Exercise Clause to exemptions from laws of 
general applicability). 
12 For an excellent discussion offormal and substantive neutrality, see Laycock, supra 
note 3 (discussing formal and substantive neutrality and rejecting formal neutrality). See 
also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 877-85 (2000)(Souter, J., dissenting)(tracing move from 
more substantive form of neutrality to formal or evenhandedness neutrality reflected in 
plurality opinion). 
13 See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAlNED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 96 (1995) [hereinafter FOREORDAINED 
FAILURE) ("The foregoing discussion suggests that the quest for neutrality, despite its 
understandable appeal and the tenacity with which it has been pursued, is an attempt to 
grasp at an illusion."); Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of 
Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Values-A Critical Analysis of -Neutrality TheoryD and 
Charitable Choice, 13 NOTRE DAME J .L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'y 243, 247 (1999) ("In theory and 
practice, neutrality theory does not live up to its own ideals ... ."); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, 
Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the 'No Endorsement' 
Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266, 314, 316 (1987) [hereinafter Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal 
Illusions) ("[P)ervasive commitment to neutrality has not yet generated any clear and 
convincing account of what neutrality actually entails. It has become increasingly clear, 
rather, that neutrality is a 'coat of many colors' ... our attempts to say what neutrality 
means turn out to be indeterminate and deeply ambiguous."). Cf John T. Valauri, The 
Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 83, 92 (1986) 
("The conceptual complexity, formality, and ambiguity of neutrality are interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing. They make the concept abstract and incomplete."). 
14 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 3, at 1005 
([S)ubstantive neutrality requires a baseline from which to measure 
encouragement and discouragement. What state of affairs is the 
background norm from which to judge whether religion has been 
encouraged or discouraged? This question also requires judgment; there 
is no simple test that can be mechanically applied to yield sensible 
answers.); 
cf Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. 
REv. 763, 793 (1993) ("[N)o neutral principle for selecting the baseline that def"mes neutrality 
has been established. "); Michael A Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An 
Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
311, 333 (1986) (" 'Neutrality,' like 'equality,' is a principle of relationship, not of content. A 
statement such as 'the state should be neutral' is completely vacuous; it says nothing about 
that with respect to which the state is supposed to be neutral."). But see Steven D. Smith, 
The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REv. 305, 319-24 (1990) (critiquing argument that 
neutrality requires baseline and rejecting neutrality as empty ideal). 
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proceed either to propose some better form of"neutrality,"15 propose 
another broad principle to replace or work in connection with 
neutrality,16 recognize the problem but proceed to doctrinal issues, 17 
or suggest that the illusive nature of neutrality militates in favor of 
judicial restraint in religion clause cases. is Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court appears to be on a course towards making neutrality 
the centerpiece of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 19 
Specifically, the Rehnquist Court has applied formal neutrality, 
which focuses on the facial neutrality of government action, and on 
the role private choice plays in directing government aid to religious 
entities in the aid context.20 
Claims of neutrality cannot be proven. There is no independent 
neutral truth or baseline to which they can be tethered.21 Thus, any 
baseline to which we attach neutrality is not neutral; claims of 
neutrality built on these baselines are by their nature not neutral. 
15 See generally Laycock, supra note 3 (suggesting that substantive neutrality is better 
concept than formal or dissaggregated neutrality). 
16 Id. at 995-99 (arguing that neutrality is inadequate principle and must be 
supplemented with other principles). See also Brownstein, supra note 13, at 246-47 
(suggesting that principles of liberty, equality, and free speech are key to interpreting 
Religion Clauses); Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. 
L. REV. 146, 146-47, 151-52, 165-67 (1986) (suggesting that, while neutrality is sometimes 
adequate principle under Religion Clauses, religious liberty is guiding principle, and 
neutrality is acceptable corollary when it furthers that principle). 
17 See generally David K. DeWolf, State Action Under the Religion Clauses: Neutral in 
Result or Neutral in Treatment?, 24 U. RICH. L. REv. 253 (1990) (discussing controversy 
surrounding religion in Supreme Court); Griffm, supra note 4 (noting Court's disputes over 
religion). 
18 SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 13, at 120-27 (suggesting over-reliance on 
judicial review in religious freedom context). See Gerard V. Bradley, Protecting Religious 
Liberty: Judicial and Legislative Responsibilities, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 253, 260 (1992) 
(commenting that it is better to consider religious liberty "free of the constraints that implicit 
commitments to judicial enforcement impose"). 
19 See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (applying neutrality 
analysis in school voucher setting); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793,803-36 (2000) (plurality) 
(applying facial neutrality to uphold Chapter 2 of Title I of Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act ofl965);MitcheU, 530 U.S. at 836-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (rejecting pure 
facial neutrality approach, and suggesting that facial neutrality plus private choice is good 
approach). 
20 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 651-63 (applying neutrality analysis to uphold school voucher 
program against Establishment Clause challenge). 
21 See generally SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 13; Alexander, supra note 
14; Paulsen, supra note 14; Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions, supra note 
13; Smith, supra note 14. 
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This reasoning might seem circular-i.e., since there is no 
independent state of neutrality from which to derive neutral rules 
or applications of rules, there can be no neutral results and no 
means by which one can prove that a given baseline is neutral. Yet 
some scholars have recognized that neutrality is not provable or that 
conceptions of neutrality can vary depending on the baseline one 
chooses to undergird one's conception of neutrality. 22 Moreover, the 
Court has used varying concepts of neutrality. In several cases 
Justices in the majority and dissenting opinions claimed to be 
relying on principles of neutrality yet reached opposite conclusions. 23 
Still, for all the problems the concept of neutrality caused in terms 
of doctrinal coherence, the fact that the Court generally viewed it as 
a broad and nebulous principle forced the Justices to rely on other 
principles in forming their views. 24 Douglas Laycock and Frederick 
Mark Gedicks have recently reinforced the notion that separation 
is one such augmenting principle (or that neutrality augments 
separation). 25 Yet separation suffers some of the same problems as 
neutrality. 26 
Concern about neutrality has come into clearer focus, however, 
since the Supreme Court's recent decision in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris. 27 This Article will suggest that even though neutrality is a 
22 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
23 Compare Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-11, 829-36 (plurality opinion) (applying form of 
neutrality analysis to support rmding that aid program distributes funds evenhandedly), with 
id. at 877-84, 911-13 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing plurality for relying on formal 
neutrality analysis not supported by precedent). Compare Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 222-27 (1963) (equating separation with neutrality), with id. at 317 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that neutrality requires accommodation of religious beliefs but does not 
allow government to "coerce a preference among such beliefs"). 
24 Cf. FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHEToRIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 1-2 (1995) (suggesting that Court has not 
applied neutrality as coherent principle but rather has relied on variety of other principles 
that have contributed to incoherence in Religion Clause jurisprudence); Steven K. Green, Of 
(Un)equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectifying the Imbalance Between Neutrality and 
Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REv. 1111, 1116-17 (2002) (asserting that neutrality is an adjunct 
to separationism); Laycock, supra note 3, at 998 (arguing that neutrality ·cannot be the only 
principle" used in Religion Clause analysis). 
26 Frederick Mark Gedicks,A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L. 
REV. 1071 (2002); Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 
EMORYL.J. 43 (1997). 
26 See infra notes 282-97 and accompanying text (discussing separation doctrine). 
27 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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myth, we can still deal with the concept so long as it is unpacked 
and understood to be simply a construction. 28 Still, the current 
Court's version of neutrality is particularly problematic because of 
its intensively formalistic nature and the fact that it appears to 
minimize the effects of government programs. 29 Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence has traditionally been fact-sensitive, but the 
Court's formal neutrality approach lacks the tools to deal with the 
many situations to which it will invariably be applied. The more 
flexible Lemon test30 was much maligned because of the 
questionable distinctions drawn by the Court.31 Thirty years from 
now, the Court's apparent move toward a formal neutrality test 
might be viewed in the same way. Formalism does not necessarily 
beget clarity, and in the end-when the issues that arise are 
complex and fact specific-a more formalistic test may lead to less 
clarity in the long-run. Such a test must either be contorted to fit 
the diversity of situations to which it will be applied, or it will ignore 
context and function somewhat like a bull in a china shop. All of 
this will be explored in greater depth in Part 11.32 
The Court's decision in Zelman brings to mind a quotation from 
Professor Philip Kurland's classic 1961 article, Of Church and State 
and the Supreme Court.33 In describing a "neutral principle" that 
would "give the most appropriate scope to the religion clauses,"34 
Kurland explained: 
This 'neutral principle' has been framed in reliance on 
the Aristotelian axiom that 'it is the mark of an educated 
28 See infra notes 52-247, 325-463 and accompanying text. 
29 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652-53; Steven K. Green, The Illusionary Aspect of "Private 
ChoiceD for Constitutional Analysis, 38 WILLAMETl'E L. REV. 549, 551 (2002). 
30 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (setting forth test, based on 
earlier cases, requiring that government action (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has a primary 
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) avoids excessive entanglement 
between government and religion). 
31 Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Cm. L. REV. 115, 127-
34 (1992); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 795, 800-13 
(1993). 
32 See infra notes 52-247 and accompanying text. 
33 Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 
(1961). 
34 [d. at 2. 
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man to seek precision in each class of things just so far 
as the nature of the subject admits,' rather than the 
Platonic precept that 'a perfectly simple principle can 
never be applied to a state of things which is the reverse 
of simple.,35 
After considering the Court's decision in Zelman, I am inclined 
to favor the Platonic precept over the Aristotelian axiom upon which 
Professor Kurland relied. The vast web offactual scenarios involved 
in funding cases and equal access cases-situations where the Court 
has already applied formal neutralitr6-is by no means simple, yet 
this Article argues that formal neutrality is an intensely simple 
concept (although in no way perfect).37 While Professor Kurland 
may have advocated a version of formal neutrality, it is unlikely he 
was advocating the kind of acontextual neutrality towards which the 
Court seems headed.38 
If indeed there is no such thing as neutrality in Establishment 
Clause cases, and the current Court's concept of formal neutrality 
is flawed, where can we turn for a less flawed Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence? Alternatives proposed by scholars and others 
include: separationism,39 accommodation,40 equality, 41 liberty, 42 non-
preferentialism,43 and some hybrid of these principles with 
35 [d. 
36 See infra notes 127-247 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 52-247 and accompanying text. 
38 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 999 ("I will call this standard formal neutrality. 1 will 
not call it Kurland's Rule, because 1 am not sure he intended it in the way it has come to be 
understood."); see generally Kurland, supra note 33, at 2-6 (advocating formal neutrality, but 
not necessarily in rigid form used by current Court). 
39 See, e.g., Green, supra note 24, at 1116-17 (discussing role of separationism in 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and its relationship with neutrality). 
40 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell,Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 5-9 
(discussing connection between accommodation and liberty). 
41 See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Equal Regard, in LAw & 
HEUGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 200,203 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000) (recommending 
"equal regard"). Cf. Brownstein, supra note 13, at 246-56 (advocating both equality and 
liberty). 
42 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 16, at 151-52 (suggesting that religious liberty is 
guiding principle under Religious Clauses). Cf. Brownstein, supra note 13, at 246-56 
(advocating both liberty and equality). 
43 See, e.g., Robert L. Cord, Church-State Separation: Restoring the 'No Preference' 
Doctrine of the First Amendment, 9 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 129, 136-39 (1986) (supporting 
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neutrality.44 I do not mean to imply that these concepts do not make 
their own claims to neutrality but rather that they have been 
identified as broad principles in their own right. This Article will 
argue that most of these concepts have something to contribute to 
Religion Clause Jurisprudence, but no single principle is adequate 
across the varied contexts of religion clause cases.45 Indeed, some 
of these principles are little more than malleable constructions. The 
Article will propose a new test, the "facilitation test," which is based 
on several narrow principles. 46 
Part II of this Article will explore the basic thesis that neutrality 
does not exist under the Establishment Clause and the implications 
of this thesis for three recent cases in which the Court relied heavily 
on that concept.47 In the process, formal neutrality and substantive 
neutrality will be explored, along with competing or augmenting 
concepts such as separationism and accommodationism. Part III 
will argue that the Court and its critics have erred by placing undue 
reliance on "broad principles" in the Establishment Clause context. 48 
The Article will propose a new test supported by multiple narrow 
principles. Recent discussions ofliberty and equality as overarching 
principles will be woven into this Part, but it will ultimately suggest 
that they suffer some of the same flaws as neutrality. Part IV will 
set forth and analyze a new test for evaluating Establishment 
Clause claims.49 The test is based on government facilitation of 
religion, and it will be applied to a variety of scenarios. Moreover, 
a corollary ofthe test-one based on government discouragement of 
religion-will be discussed. This corollary would also be applicable 
in the Free Exercise Clause context. This Article will focus on the 
nonpreferentialism); Rodney K. Smith, Nonpreferentialism in Establishment Clause Analysis: 
A Response to Professor Laycock, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 245, 247-63 (1991) (discussing 
nonpreferentialism in response to Professor Laycock's repudiation of concept). 
« See Conkle, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing impact of "formal neutrality" upon religious 
liberty); Gedicks, supra note 25, at 1076 (discussing separation and neutrality); Laycock, 
supra note 25, at 46 (discussing combined benefit of separation and neutrality). Cf. John H. 
Garvey, What's Next After Separationism ~, 46 EMORY L.J. 75 (1997) (discussing equality and 
neutrality). 
45 See infra notes 248-324 and accompanying text. 
48 See infra notes 325-463 and accompanying text. 
47 See infra notes 52-247 and accompanying text. 
48 See infra notes 248-324 and accompanying text. 
49 See infra notes 325-463 and accompanying text. 
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Establishment Clause, however, and will only address Free Exercise 
Clause concerns where necessary. 50 Still, the Article will necessarily 
reference free exercise issues in places because of the inevitable 
connection between establishment and free exercise concerns.51 
II. NEUTRALITY DOES NOT EXIST 
Steven Smith has explained: 
[T]he quest for neutrality, despite its understandable 
appeal and the tenacity with which it has been pursued, 
is an attempt to grasp at an illusion. Upon reflection, 
this failure should not be surprising. The impossibility 
of a truly 'neutral' theory of religious freedom is 
analogous to the impossibility, recognized by modern 
philosophers, of finding some outside Archimedean 
point ... from which to look down on and describe 
reality. Descriptions of reality are always undertaken 
from a point within reality. In the same way, theories of 
religious freedom are always offered from the viewpoint 
of one of the competing positions that generate the need 
for such a theory; there is no neutral vantage point that 
can permit the theorist or judge to transcend these 
competing positions. Hence, insofar as a genuine and 
satisfactory theory of religious freedom would need to be 
'neutral' in this sense, rather than one that privileges 
one of the competing positions from the outset, a theory 
of religious freedom is as illusory as the ideal of 
neutrality it seeks to embody.52 
50 Those who advocate a unified approach to the Religion Clauses may perceive this as 
an artificial line to draw, but the focus upon the Establishment Clause is not meant to 
support an absolute dichotomy in analysis between the two religion clauses. Rather, it is a 
reflection of the complexity of the issues involved and the added clarity-albeit via a 
somewhat artificial distinction-provided by focusing on the Establishment Clause. 
51 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It- The Supreme Court 
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495. 504 (1986) ("The establishment clause's tension with 
the free exercise clause ... is unique and well-documented."). 
52 SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 13, at 96-97. See also Smith, Symbols, 
Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions, supra note 13, at 314 ("[P]ervasive commitment to 
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Other scholars have also acknowledged the illusive and malleable 
nature of neutrality. 53 Yet, the Supreme Court has often used the 
term neutrality in its Religion Clause jurisprudence54 and has 
recently placed a great deal of emphasis on neutrality in a number 
of cases.55 The Court's use of the term until recently was largely 
symbolic-not in the sense that William Marshall's fascinating work 
has used that term56-but rather in the sense that the Court was 
trying to send a message that its consideration of the issues was 
balanced. 57 The Court did not use neutrality as the "be all" or "end 
all" concept in actually deciding cases. Rather, it also had to rely on 
other principles because neutrality is so malleable, 58 or-as Steven 
Smith has argued-parasitic. 59 If there is no such thing as 
neutrality-or at least neutrality as more than a buzzword-this 
seems a logical state of affairs. The Court suggests that it is acting 
neutrally but can only define this neutrality by reference to other 
principles (which are not neutral). 
neutrality has not yet generated any clear and convincing account of what neutrality actually 
entails. It has become increasingly clear, rather, that neutrality is a 'coat of many colors.' "). 
53 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
54 See supra notes 1-3, 5-11, 23 and accompanying text; infra notes 127-247 and 
accompanying text. See also Frederick Schauer, Neutrality and Judicial Review, 22 LAW & 
PHIL. 217, 234 (2003) (critiquing Herbert Wechsler's notion of neutral principles and noting 
that "the judicial creation of constitutional principles can [not] in any comprehensible form 
be neutral as between competing visions of just what those principles should be. To put it 
more bluntly, there simply cannot be a neutral principle."). 
66 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,670 (2002) (concluding voucher program 
was neutral between religious and nonreligious schools); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. 
Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 114 (2001) (allowing religious club to use school grounds); Mitchell v. 
Helms, 530 U.S. 793,809 (2000) (relying on neutrality to uphold aid program); Rosenberger 
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,842 (1995) (deciding public university can 
provide funding to religious student group publication on neutral basis). 
158 Marshall, supra note 51, at 498 (advocating approach that is more focused on symbolic 
impact of government action than on government involvement with, and support of, religion). 
67 Of course, while the Court may have been trying to send the message that it was being 
balanced in its Religion Clause decisions, that message presumed there is a way to be 
balanced in such cases. Many people disagreed that the Court was being balanced. See, e.g., 
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEAsE DoN'T WISH ME AMERRyCHRlSTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF 
THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, 254 (1997) (arguing that "constitutional principle of 
separation of church and state does not equally protect the religious liberty of all, including 
outgroups, and does not determine judicial outcomes"); Gedicks, supra note 24, at 27 (noting 
that religion clause jurisprudence is viewed as both "oppressive" and "neutral"). 
68 See infra notes 81-126 and accompanying text; supra notes 13-14 and accompanying 
text. 
68 Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions, supra note 13, at 268, 325-31. 
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The current Court, however, has begun to rely on neutrality more 
directly.60 Neutrality is no longer a background principle that the 
Court sees no need to consistently define. Rather, it is an actuating 
principle that the Court apparently believes must be given a 
formalistic definition which can be rigidly applied.61 As will be seen, 
the Court connects its formal neutrality with what appear to be 
arguments for formal equality between religion and "non-religion. "62 
Yet, as this Part will demonstrate, the current Court's neutrality is 
no more neutral than past Courts' neutrality. In fact, because of its 
formalistic nature, this Court's approach is potentially "less 
neutral"-if it is possible to be less than something that does not 
exist-because at least potentially if a government action or inaction 
meets the Court's definition of neutrality (and the element of 
individual choice discussed below), pesky things such as the effects 
of the program. need not be considered.63 This is particulat:ly 
problematic because the Court does not explain why its formal 
neutrality is neutral given the competing views of neutrality, yet it 
uses terms such as "entirely neutral,»64 "neutral in all respects,»65 
and "a program. of true private choice. »66 By relying on the term 
"neutrality" in this direct, yet unsubstantiated manner, the Court 
gives it extra power. 
The Rehnquist Court's neutrality approach will be discussed in 
greater detail in Part II.B of this Article.67 For now, it is useful to 
understand that the Court requires a law or government policy to be 
facially neutral and that any benefit or funding that flows to 
religious entities does so as the result of the choices of private 
eo ZelTTum, 536 U.S. at 670; Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809 (plurality opinion). 
61 In her concurring opinion in Mitchell, Justice O'Connor decried the central role of 
neutrality in the plurality's approach. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
("[TJhe plurality's treatment of neutrality comes close to assigning that factor singular 
importance in the future adjudication of Establishment Clause challenges to government 
school aid programs."). 
62 See infra notes 127-85 and accompanying text. See generally Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639. 
63 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 684-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 686-89, 694-708 (Souter, J., 
dissenting); id. at 726-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
64 1d. at 662. 
M 1d. at 653. 
M 1d. at 653, 665. 
67 See infra notes 127-85 and accompanying text. 
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individuals.sa As will be seen below, this approach has not been 
applied in all Establishment Clause cases, but to the extent it has 
been applied, the private choice element may have lost its 
substantive bite.69 
Lurking underneath the Court's "formal neutrality" doctrine is 
the notion that religion has no special status, and thus there is no 
need to differentiate between religion and non-religion if the 
government is acting "neutrally."70 A corollary to this notion is the 
argument that, by treating religion differently, one is being hostile 
to religion. Thus, it is discrimination and hostility to religion if 
religious organizations are not given access to the same benefits as 
secular organizations,71 and at the same time there is nothing wrong 
with failing to provide religious exemptions to "generally applicable" 
laws even if those laws interfere with core religious practices. 72 
There would be significant problems with the Court's implicit 
presumptions even if neutrality were a real and attainable concept, 
but if neutrality is nothing more than an empty construction as this 
Article asserts,73 the Court's other presumptions are even more 
problematic. 
To understand the Rehnquist Court's notion of neutrality, it is 
useful to explore several of the cases where the Court has used 
neutrality analysis in varying contexts. Thus, Parts II.B, ILc, and 
ILD of this Article will evaluate the Court's recent decisions in 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,74 Good News Club v. Milford Central 
School,75 and Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. 
68 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662 (holding voucher program to be one of "true private 
choice"). See also infra notes 127-85 and accompanying text (discussing Rehnquist Court's 
neutrality approach). 
69 See infra notes 127-85 and accompanying text. See also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. 
Tuttle, Zelman's Future: Vouchers, SectarianProuiders, and the Next Round ofConstitutwnal 
Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 917, 938 (2003) (discussing Mitchell Court's limitation on 
independent significance of "genuine" choice). 
70 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 651-53; Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793,826-29 (2002) (plurality 
opinion). Cf. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 110-12, 114 (2001) 
(addressing viewpoint discrimination). 
71 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 118-20; Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828-29 (plurality opinion). 
72 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990). 
73 See infra notes 81-185, 248-324 and accompanying text. 
74 536 U.S. 639 (2002). See infra notes 127-85 and accompanying text. 
75 533 U.S. 98 (2001). See infra notes 186-218 and accompanying text. 
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Pinette,76 respectively. Each case represents a major area where the 
Court has used a version of its neutrality concept. First, in Zelman, 
the Court dealt with government aid to religious schools.77 Second, 
in Good News Club, the issue was equal access for religious 
groupS.78 Finally, in Capitol Square, the Court considered religious 
speech in a traditional public forum. 79 There are a number of other 
cases where the Court has used its formal neutrality principle, and 
they will also be addressed where relevant. Based on the test 
proposed later in this Article, Zelman was wrongly decided, and the 
other two cases were correctly decided. However, neither the results 
nor the analysis the Court used in the latter two cases were 
neutral. 80 
A. WHAT IS NEUTRALITY? 
The answer to the question-"What is neutrality?"-is central to 
the discussion of neutrality's place in religion clause jurisprudence. 
Thus, the answer that neutrality in the religion clause context is a 
myth may seem wholly unsatisfying. Yet can there be some use for 
a concept that is impossible to achieve? Neutrality is nothing more 
than a variable social construction, and formal neutrality is nothing 
more than a rigid judicial construction. Even though each 
construction relies on a baseline that is not provably neutral, each 
has a value because people take solace in the notion ofneutrality.81 
Even if objectivity does not exist, there may be value in the 
perception of objectivity.82 
76 515 U.S. 753 (1995). See infra notes 219-47 and accompanying text. 
77 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639. 
78 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 98. 
79 Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 753. 
so See infra notes 325-463 and accompanying text (setting forth facilitation test). 
81 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 998 (noting that governmental aspirations toward 
neutrality reassure religious minorities); Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal 
Illusions, supra note 13, at 313, 329, 331 (noting that people take solace in notion that 
neutrality prevents government from exhibiting partiality). 
82 Cf. Frank S. Ravitch, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? A Nonfoundationalist 
Analysis of Richard Posner's The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 37 TuLsA L. REV. 
967,971 (2002) (stating that the "social belief in 'natural' rights might be useful in a given 
context, even if they are not objectively natural and are actually contingent on context ... "). 
HeinOnline -- 38 Ga. L. Rev. 503 2003-2004
2004] ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND NEUTRALITY 503 
This sounds a bit odd at first, but it actually tracks much of what 
the pre-Rehnquist Court did with the concept of neutrality. 
Neutrality was mentioned quite a bit in numerous contexts, and 
sometimes the Court used a vague adjective to describe it such as 
"benevolent neutrality.,,83 Yet the Court never relied exclusively on 
the principle, supplementing it with separationism84 or 
accommodationism.85 For those who did not dig too deeply, there 
was always the reassuring tone of neutrality. For those who did dig, 
it was apparent that, while the Court could not substantiate its 
claim to neutrality,86 it had the other principles to fall back on and 
one could support or attack those other principles without focusing 
on whether they were neutral in application or effect.87 It would not 
be a reach to read these cases and perceive that the Court was 
essentially saying: "We are following a separationist principle or an 
accommodationist principle that we think is more neutral than the 
alternatives in this context, but neutrality is only the lofty object of 
the religion clauses, not something we can prove with absolute 
certainty. " 
I do not defend the earlier Courts' use of the term. It was in a 
sense false advertising because there is no way to prove that 
separationism or accommodationism is inherently more neutral 
than other principles.88 Yet the implicit message that was at least 
potentially infused in these earlier decisions-we know that 
neutrality is just a lofty principle and we are only using it to 
describe the outcome in this case vis a vis the alternatives-is less 
troubling than claims that both the mode of analysis and the results 
83 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). 
84 See generally Laycock, supra note 25 (discussing underlying unity of separation of 
neutrality). 
85 See McConnell, supra note 40, at 3-6 (discussing concept of accommodation). 
86 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (listing sources which argue that neutrality 
does not exist). 
87 See Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions, supra note 13, at 314 
(suggesting that it would be impossible to prove neutrality, so other principles could not be 
accurately deimed by neutrality ideal). 
86 It is possible that concepts such as separation and accommodation might serve as 
baselines for neutrality, see Laycock, supra note 3, at 996-98, 1004-05, but there is no place 
from which one can prove that any such baseline is neutral. See SMITH, FOREORDAINED 
FAILURE, supra note 13, at 96-97 (arguing that quest for neutrality is attempt to grasp an 
illusion). 
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are neutral, while the alternatives are not. The latter is the 
message of the Rehnquist Court. The current Court has converted 
neutrality from a lofty goal to both the means and ends of religion 
clause analysis.89 Thus, the question "What is neutrality?" takes on 
greater import. 
The Court's struggle with neutrality reminds me of a 
conversation I recently had with my five-year-old daughter who was 
excited when she realized that her tooth was loose and would soon 
fall out. She realized that I might be the tooth fairy, and she asked 
if the tooth fairy is real or if I was the tooth fairy. Not wanting to 
lie to her or burst her bubble, I responded that the tooth fairy would 
leave her a present when she lost her tooth. She responded that she 
knows I am the tooth fairy but that she wants the tooth fairy to visit 
and leave her a present anyway. 
This is akin to the struggle for neutrality. Like the tooth fairy, 
neutrality is just a myth, but like children who want the tooth fairy 
to visit, we want neutrality to be real or at least for something to 
stand in for it to make us believe it is real. Unlike my five-year-old 
daughter, however, the Rehnquist Court has strenuously argued in 
essence that the tooth fairy is real, and when confronted with the 
question of why, the answer seems to be, "because we said so." The 
nuance of the stand-in concept-neutrality not as a real thing but 
as a lofty principle that we try to emulate-seems lost. 
Of course, even though neutrality as a lofty principle is less 
problematic than formal neutrality because it is not used to reach 
or empower outcomes, it is no more neutral. Thus, it is useful to 
look at another conception of neutrality that is far more nuanced 
and sophisticated. This conception of neutrality is one that 
recognizes there is no agreement about what neutrality is. I am 
referring to Douglas Laycock's construction of substantive 
neutrality.90 Laycock is not alone in arguing for substantive 
neutrality. Scholars,91 as well as Justices of the Supreme COurt,92 
89 See infra notes 127-85 and accompanying text. 
90 See generally Laycock, supra note 3, at 1001-06; Laycock, supra note 25, at 68-73. 
91 See HughJ. Breyer, Laycock's Substantive Neutrality and Nuechterlein's Free Exercise 
Test: Implications of Their Convergence for the Religion Clauses, 10 J .L. & RELIGION 467,476-
90 (1994) (applying Laycock's theory to select cases); Stephen V. Monama, Substantive 
Neutrality as a Basis for Free Exercise-No Establishment Common Ground, 42 J. CHURCH & 
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have argued for some form of substantive neutrality. Professor 
Laycock's substantive neutrality has a lot to recommend it. In fact, 
it has had a strong influence on the facilitation approach I propose 
below.93 Still, as I hope to show, his approach has a lot of 
substantive value, but no neutrality.9. This might seem a bit 
nitpicky because, as will be seen, the approach has a lot to offer. 
But while Professor Laycock may have made a wise choice among 
potential baselines, his choice and the resulting baseline are no 
more neutral than the Court's formal neutrality. 95 
Professor Laycock's formulation of substantive neutrality is 
reflected in the following quote: 
My basic formulation of substantive neutrality is this: 
the religion clauses require government to minimize the 
extent to which it either encourages or discourages belief 
or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or 
nonobservance. If I have to stand or fall on a single 
formulation of neutrality, I will stand or fall on that one. 
But I must elaborate on what I mean by minimizing 
encouragement or discouragement. I mean that religion 
is to be left as wholly to private choice as anything can 
be. It should proceed as unaffected by government as 
possible. Government should not interfere with our 
ST. 13 (2000) (arguing that interpretation of two religion clauses should be grounded in 
substantive neutrality concept). 
92 Perhaps the most eloquent plea for substantive neutrality in recent years has come 
form Justice Souter. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 688, 695-98 (2002) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (rejecting Court's use offormal neutrality, and arguing for substantive 
neutrality); Mitchell v. Helms, 630 U.S. 793, 877-84 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that evenhandedness neutrality as stand-alone criterion of constitutional intent or effect is 
insufficient); see generally Liza Weiman Hanks, Note, Justice Souter: Defining ·Substantive 
Nuetrality· in an Age of Religious Politics, 48 STAN. L. REv. 903 (1996). 
93 See infra notes 326-463 and accompanying text. 
1M This is not because of any flaw in Professor Laycock's reasoning but rather a result of 
the epistemological claim inherent in any concept of neutrality. See SMITH, FOREORDAINED 
FAILURE, Bupra note 13, at 96-97 (recognizing illusory nature of neutrality). Laycock 
recognizes the epistemic problem with claims to neutrality and addresses the concern by 
pointing out that neutrality is a function of the baseline one sets for the concept. Laycock, 
supra note 3, at 994, 996, 1004-05. Yet, without some way to determine if a given baseline 
is neutral, the setting of such a baseline cannot make a concept neutral. Smith, Bupra note 
14, at 319-24. 
96 Smith, supra note 14, at 319-24. 
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beliefs about religion either by coercion or by persuasion. 
Religion may flourish or wither; it may change or stay 
the same. What happens to religion is up to the people 
acting severally and voluntarily; it is not up to the 
people acting collectively through government. 96 
Professor Laycock refers to the above as a formulation of 
neutrality,97 but while it is immensely valuable, is it neutral? 
Professor Laycock suggests that neutrality depends on the baseline 
one sets in defining it, and that there are varying baselines.98 This 
Article asserts that a problem arises as a result because there is no 
super-baseline to determine whether a given baseline is neutral.99 
Yet the very term. neutrality asserts an epistemic (in the sense that 
it suggests some theory or way to know something is neutral) and 
arguably teleological claim. A given baseline might be a useful 
paradigm for Establishment Clause jurisprudence, but unless one 
can demonstrate the neutrality of the baseline itself, the baseline 
cannot support claims of neutrality. 100 
The Zelman case is a good example through which to view this. 101 
lfthe Court in Zelman had held that vouchers are unconstitutional 
when given for attendance at religious schools but that districts can 
maintain vouchers for secular private schools and of course can 
maintain the secularized public schools without any voucher 
program, would the result encourage secularism ?102 Would such a 
limitation advance private choice, or would it place burdens only on 
the private choice of religious individuals because they must choose 
between a secular education free of charge and their values?103 Yet, 
96 Laycock, supra note 3, at 1001-02. 
97 See id. at 1001 (labeling his proposal "formulation of substantive neutrality"). 
98 [d. at 994, 996, 1004-05. 
99 See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 
1996) (discussing paradigms in sciences and asserting that there is no super-paradigm to 
decide between conflicting paradigms). 
100 Smith, supra note 14, at 319-24. 
101 See infra notes 127-85 and accompanying text (discussing Zelman case in greater 
detail). 
102 See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding voucher system 
constitutional). 
103 This Hobson's choice may be reflective of a larger issue, namely, the possibility that 
cultural, legal, and political currents favor secularism and may place religious adherents at 
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under the Court's holding which allows vouchers to be used at 
religious schools, there is a powerful argument that religion, and 
particularly more dominant and well-funded religions, will benefit 
from an infusion of government funds 104 and that private choice will 
be skewed toward sending one's children to schools with whose faith 
mission one disagrees simply to keep them on a level playing field 
with other children in the area who may face no such conflict. 105 
Which of these options is neutral? Which encourages or 
discourages religion the most? These are actually two very different 
questions. The first is unanswerable in any objective way unless 
one has a magic key to demonstrate which contested account of 
neutrality is actually neutral. Yet the second question is 
answerable, even if it is not precisely so. More importantly, even 
though the answer may be contestable, the contestability of the 
answer is more open to debate when it is not appended to the 
concept of neutrality. The answer must be debated on its merits, 
without regard to the unprovable claim· that it is neutral;106 
neutrality should have no power in the interpretive process. As 
Steven Smith has implied, calling a result neutral adds nothing of 
value to an argument. 107 Additionally, doing so may either obfuscate 
the nature and value of other principles that undergird an argument 
or unnecessarily prop up those principles. 
Yet, as will be seen, this does not destroy the force of Laycock's 
principle. 108 Significantly, the fact that divorcing Laycock's 
substantive principle from neutrality does not undermine that 
principle demonstrates the lack of im port the neutrali ty concept has. 
As between formal neutrality and substantive neutrality, 
substantive neutrality is the better option, not because it is more 
a disadvantage by inducing them to take part in the dominant secularized culture at the 
expense of their deeply held religious convictions. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE 
CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAw AND POLITICS TRlVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 
(1993). 
104 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 684-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 687 (Souter, J., 
dissenting); Green, supra note 24. 
105 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 704 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
106 SMITH, FOREORDAlNEDFAlLURE, supra note 13, at 96-97; Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, 
and Doctrinal Illusions, supra note 13, at 314. 
107 Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions, supra note 13, at 268, 325-31. 
108 See infra notes 325-463 and accompanying text (formulating facilitation test from 
substantive "neutrality" theory). 
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neutral-neither option is neutral-but because it is still useful 
even when divorced from its neutrality claim. The Court's formal 
neutrality hinges too much on neutrality as a real concept, or at 
least on formal equality as neutrality, 109 and while a more 
sophisticated and consistently applied version of the equality 
principle could have independent value,110 the formal-equality-as-
formal-neutrality version has little to offer since its claim to 
neutrality cannot be proven. 
Issues surrounding governmental interaction with religious 
entities have become increasingly complex over the last hundred 
years or so as government, both state and federal, has grown and 
gotten involved in many areas oflife where there was traditionally 
little or no government participation or regulation.1ll It is hard for 
government to act "neutrally" when its actions or failure to act in 
the same situation can have massive repercussions.112 This creates 
problems for any "neutrality" test that must be applied to this 
massive web of government action and inaction. At the theoretical 
level, such a test cannot make an absolute claim to neutrality 
because there is no principle of super-neutrality to demonstrate a 
test's neutrality; contested perspectives necessarily enter the 
process of developing such a test. 113 It would solve the problem if 
one could prove neutrality by looking at the effects of a court's 
approach, but as the above examples demonstrate, this is impossible 
to do without presuming that a certain baseline is neutral and using 
the presumed baseline to justify the neutrality of the outcomes. 114 
109 See generally Zelman, 536 U.S. 639. 
110 See generally Brownstein, supra note 13 (arguing for equality principle); Eisgruber & 
Sager, supra note 41 (arguing for equality principle in religious liberty jurisprudence). 
111 Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental 
Power, 84 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1998); Feldman, supra note 4, at 679-80; Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering 
Death of Separation ism , 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 230 (1994); McConnell, supra note 40, at 14, 
23-24. 
112 Smith, Symbols. Perceptions. and Doctrinal Illusions, supra note 13, at 329-31. This 
is also reflected in the differences between the majority and dissenting opinions in Zelman. 
Compare Zelman, 536 U.S. at 643-63, with id. at 684-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and id. at 
686-717 (Souter, J., dissenting), and id. at 717-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
113 Cf. Kuhn, supra note 99, at 150-58 (making similar argument about lack of super-
paradigm in sciences that would allow one to select between various contested scientific 
paradigms). 
114 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 994, 996, 1004-05 (proposing baseline analysis). 
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Let us look at another example. Suppose a creation science 
advocate applies to the National Science Foundation (NSF) for a 
grant.115 To make this hypothetical even more interesting, let us 
assume that the creation scientist is not from the "intelligent design 
theory school," which makes a greater attempt to assume the mantle 
of mainstream science,116 but is a traditional advocate of creation 
science. Moreover, assume the creation scientist is applying on 
behalf of a creation science center and not a specific church or 
religious organization, and assume the center has no direct 
connection to any such religious entity. The applicant and his team 
all have PhD's in biology or chemistry, some from evangelical 
universities. Their proposed project consists of proving that 
spontaneous evolution in lower organisms proves that evolution 
could have happened in a much shorter period of time than is 
currently accepted and that evolution is limited to certain 
organisms. They argue that the period of time would be between six 
and seven thousand years and that humans are not among the 
organisms that have evolved. In fact, they suggest 
Australopithecus, Homo Erectus, and Homo Habilis were all simply 
spontaneous mutations from great ape species that never took hold 
and died out.1l7 
The NSF rejects the team's proposal because the creation 
scientists have not supported their hypothesis with adequate 
testable data. The scientists sue, claiming that NSF's decision 
demonstrates hostility to religion in a program open to secular 
scientific debate and that NSF undervalued their empirical data. 
How do we address this situation based on formal and substantive 
neutrality? 
The natural answer is to say that the scientists were not 
qualified to participate in the program because they were unwilling 
115 The idea for the NSF hypothetical was sparked by the implications of Zelman in 
combination with Witters and Zobrest, in regard to a statement made in Dhananjai 
Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 505, 544 (1998). 
116 For an excellent discussion of the relationship and differences between creationism and 
intelligent design theory, see ROBERTT. PENNOCK, TOWER OF BABEL: THE EvIDENCEAGAlNST 
THE NEW CREATIONISM (1999). 
117 Australopithecus, Homo Erectus, and Homo Habi1is are traditionally accepted by 
paleontolOgists as ancestors of modem humans. BERNARD G. CAMPBELL, HUMANKIND 
EMERGING 167-73, 281-96 (3d ed. 1982); G.E. KENEDY, PALEo-ANTHRoPOLOGY 205-48 (1980). 
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or unable to produce adequate scientifically acceptable data to 
support their hypothesis, and their hypothesis was unscientific, 
while the program from which they seek funding is a scientific 
program. This is of little help, however, because the creation 
scientists can simply charge that the whole selection process, 
including the reliance on secular scientific "theories" and "adequate 
scientific" data, is biased against faith-affected approaches, which 
are put at a disadvantage because they cannot compete for funding 
on an equal basis even if they engage in some empirical research. 
They would assert that the NSF's definition of science is not neutral 
as between religion and irreligion. 
Based on the Rehnquist Court's formal neutrality approach, it 
would appear that the program discriminates against faith-based 
entities, or at the very least against faith-based "scientific" 
viewpoints trying to compete with secular scientific theories in the 
marketplace of ideas. us To the extent it requires applicants to 
adhere to the scientific method preferred by secular science, it is not 
neutral as between religion and secularism. It prefers secular 
hypotheses and methods over religiously derived hypotheses, even 
when the "religious scientists" engage in some empirical research. 
Perhaps the most obvious argument in NSF's favor would be that, 
in this case, government is funding the research through a 
competitive process and on its own behalf, and by analogy to the free 
speech cases, government can "selectively fund a program to 
encourage activities that it believes are in the public interest. "U9 
The problem with the competitive process aspect of this argument 
is that the creation scientists are in essence arguing that the process 
is only competitive for those holding secular scientific views. It 
would be as if the NEA in Finley had said it would only allow artists 
118 The Court applied formal neutrality in Zelman, 536 U.S. at 670; Good News Club v. 
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 117-20 (2001); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 793 (2000); 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors ofUniv. of Va. , 515 U.S. 819, 837, 846 (1995); and Zobrest 
v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1993). See also Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 
748,760 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that denial offunding to student wishing to pursue theology 
degree under broad funding program violates Free Exercise Clause and that state interest in 
not funding religious instruction is not compelling after Zelman). 
119 See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1999); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. 
Finley, 524 U.S. 569,585 (1998); Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983); 
Davey, 299 F.3d at 752. 
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to compete if their styles were influenced by secular art or artists. 
The problem with the government-as-speaker aspect of the 
argument is that the government does not necessarily endorse all 
the scientific research that arises from NSF grants, and indeed it 
seems to be creating a "funding forum" for the exploration of 
scientific ideas (thus it might be a designated public forum open to 
"scientists"). This might make the situation more like that in 
Rosenberger, where the University of Virginia's system for funding 
student organizations was deemed a limited public forum, 120 
although the competitive nature of NSF funding could still be a 
distinguishing factor. It is, of course, quite possible that a court 
would analyze the situation presented in this hypothetical under 
Finley or the government speech cases, but let us presume for the 
moment that, as in Rosenberger, it does not, and the applicable 
analysis is the Court's neutrality analysis. Would a decision 
favoring the creation scientist be neutral? 
The answer to this question must be separated from the question 
of whether the result would promote good policy or good science. 
After all, neutrality, like objectivity, makes a universal claim that 
cannot be addressed based on one's policy preferences. 121 One could 
argue that allowing creation scientists access to NSF funding is not 
neutral because it gives religion a preferred status over other 
scientific theories that are not in the scientific mainstream. This 
begs the question for the other side, which could argue that not 
including religiously affected theories would give secularism and 
secular science preferred status and benefits over religiously 
affected theories.122 The claim that the latter theories are not 
120 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819. 
121 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting ambiguity of neutrality). 
122 Zelman leaves this possibility open, especially when one considers it in connection with 
cases that have found programs excluding religiously affected beneficiaries from government 
funds based on their religious perspectives to be unconstitutional. See, e.g. , Rosenberger, 515 
U.S. at 819 (holding that program excluding proselytizing student publication from receiving 
funds because of its viewpoint violates First Amendment); Davey, 299 F.3d at 748 (fIDding 
that denial of student wishing to pursue theology degree under government program violates 
Free Exercise Clause). The fact that the program in question is a scientific program does not 
alter this under a formal neutrality/exclusion-as-hostility-to-religion approach because 
scientific standards are simply one perspective under such an approach, and the exclusion of 
religious voices from the marketplace of ideas because they do not meet the secular standards 
would seemingly violate the fonnal neutrality approach. The fact that many in the secular 
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scientific or that the evaluators who make the scientific decisions 
reject those theories as unscientific is inadequate to address this 
concern under formal neutrality because the creation scientists can 
argue that they included empirical data in their proposal and that 
the NSF's policies and definition of science are hostile to religiously 
affected theories; therefore, the denial of funding puts those 
accounts at a disadvantage when compared to the secular scientific 
accounts. 
Moreover, once this argument is made, other religious 
groups-for example, a UFO cult that believes humans were placed 
here by aliens from the planet Zermac-would also be able to 
challenge the use of secular scientific standards in the NSF selection 
process. To avoid discriminating against religion by favoring 
secular scientific standards in a government-funded program open 
to private applicants, the only neutral process for selection among 
those willing to include empirical data in their proposals might be 
a first-come-first-served system or a lottery system. As will be seen 
in the next few sections of this Article, the creation science scenario 
is not a huge leap under the Court's formal neutrality approach. 123 
How would the creation scientist fare under a substantive 
neutrality approach? One could argue that giving government funds 
to creation scientists certainly encourages religion because of the 
financial aid and the credibility that NSF funding might lend to 
community see the exclusion of such voices as obvious could be used to prove the point that 
religious views have been skewed out of the debate by massive government funding 
supporting the secular scientific view. The notion that the secular community may view a 
situation as obvious and fair, while a religious community may look at the same situation and 
see discrimination and hostility, is not new. See, e.g., Gedicks, supra note 24, at 27 (arguing 
that differences in perceptions of religion's place (private or public) between secular and 
religious discourse "explains why, all too often, religious organizations and individuals 
experience the Supreme Court's religion clause jurisprudence as oppressive and alienating 
at the same time that others sincerely believe it to be neutral"). 
123 See infra notes 127-218 and accompanying text. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819, and Davey, 
299 F .3d 748, demonstrate that exclusion of religious viewpoints from a general program of 
funding violates the Constitution. Add to this Zelman and Good News Club, which would 
apparently allow access by religious groups to almost any government program or forum that 
is neutral on its face, and it appears that religious entities and individuals have the potential 
right to access broad ranging government programs. Furthermore, religious groups will be 
able to claim that exclusion is hostile to religion and unnecessary under the Establishment 
Clause if they are excluded based on their religious viewpoints or based on government 
preference for secular viewpoints. See infra notes 127-85 and accompanying text. 
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creation scientists. One could also argue, however, that by funding 
only secular scientific theories, government increases the ability of 
secular science to replace religion-based theories and puts religion 
at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace of ideas.124 
Professor Laycock foresaw this tension between secular programs 
and religion and recognized a caveat to his substantive neutrality 
approach: that government is not encouraging or discouraging 
religion by funding secular social activities. 125 I do not disagree with 
his caveat, but with or without the caveat, his substantive principles 
are not neutral in this context. Either side could argue the result is 
not neutral if the other side wins. 126 Thus, whatever the 
independent merits of the substantive neutrality approach, the term 
"neutrality" is a misnomer. 
B. ZELMAN V. SIMMONS-HARRIS 
Zelman is a significant case for several reasons. It is the first 
United States Supreme Court case to uphold a government-funded 
educational voucher program and thus is quite significant from the 
education policy perspective, as well as the law and religion 
perspective. Additionally, a majority of the Court affirmed the 
notion that, so long as a program is neutral on its face and functions 
through "true private choice," the program is constitutional. 127 
Finally, while the majority opinion purports to consider whether 
private individuals who channelled government money to religious 
schools had real choices, the opinion expands the pool of "choices" to 
include public magnet and charter schools. This leaves open the 
possibility that the comparison group could be further expanded to 
include all public schools, at least in districts that have open 
enrollment or public school choice programs.128 While Justice 
O'Connor tries to clarify this analysis to suggest it is simply a 
124 See supra note 122 and accompanying text (noting different perspectives of secular and 
religious communities). 
125 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 1003 ("Government routinely encourages and discourages 
all sorts of private behavior. Under substantive neutrality, these encouragements and 
discouragements are not to be applied to religion. "). 
128 See supra note 13 and accompanying text; infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text 
127 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653; id. at 670 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
128 Id. at 686-717 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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clarification of the "effects" prong of the Lemon test,129 it is hard to 
believe earlier Courts would have so expanded the comparison 
groups or found no primary effect benefitting religion given the data 
regarding the Cleveland voucher program/3D Mueller v. Allen131 
notwithstanding. The latter two points are the focus of this section. 
This Article takes no position on the educational policy aspects of 
the issue.132 
The Zelman Court ostensibly followed theAgosnnilLemon test. 133 
Yet the Court's application of the "effects" prong of that test is the 
key. As a preliminary matter, Zelman did not present a secular 
purpose issue because the goal of providing a better education to 
students in the Cleveland School District was an adequate secular 
purpose. 134 Indeed, at least in government aid and equal access 
129 [d. at 668-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
130 Compare Zelman, 536 U.S. at 647 (noting that 96% of voucher program participants 
enrolled in religiously affiliated schools), with Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779-80, 788-89 (1973) (striking state law providing maintenance and 
repair grants and tuition reimbursement grants for nonpublic schools because effect of law 
was to subsidize and advance mission of sectarian schools), Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 
625 (1971) (fIDding unconstitutional state statutes that gave state aid to church-related 
educational institutions), McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (fIDding 
unconstitutional released time program in which children could take religious classes taught 
by outside personnel in public school buildings during public school hours), and Everson v. 
Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (allowing general program that reimbursed parents for 
expenditures for their childrens' bus transportation to and from schools including parochial 
schools). See also Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686-717 (Souter, J., dissenting) (comparing majority's 
approach in Zelman with long line of aid cases). 
131 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding Minnesota statute allowing parents to deduct tuition, 
textbook and transportation expenses of their children, although deduction primarily 
benefitted parents of children attending parochial schools). 
132 Contrary to the assertions of voucher advocates, the data on the educational success 
of vouchers for private schools is mixed. Compare JOHN F. WITl'E, THE MARKET APPROACH 
TO EDUCATION 125, 133-43 (2000) (asserting that students enrolled in private schools under 
Milwaukee's voucher program have not improved math or reading skills), with Paul E. 
Peterson, School Choice: A Report Card, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 47, 69-70 (1998) (arguing 
that students enrolled at private schools under Milwaukee voucher program did improve over 
time). Since this Article is only concerned about vouchers in the context of their 
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause, the question of whether they work or not 
is beyond the scope of this Article. If they are unconstitutional, it is irrelevant whether they 
work. If they are constitutional, it is up to state and local governments to determine whether 
or not they work, and the courts are unlikely to second guess such choices. Moreover, the 
relative effectiveness of vouchers should be a factor in determining whether or not a voucher 
program violates the Establishment Clause. 
133 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648-50; id. at 668-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
134 [d. at 648-49. 
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cases, it is hard to imagine a situation where there would not be an 
adequate secular purpose. Thus, the case centered on the effects of 
the program,135 as have several other funding cases.136 
Yet there is a significant catch. In order for an indirect aid 
program to satisfy the Zelman test, the program must be neutral on 
its face, and the money must flow through individuals who have 
"true private choice" regarding where to direct the aid. 137 If a 
program is neutral on its face between religious and nonreligious 
entities, it is highly unlikely that it would ever fail the secular 
purpose test. Further, there is no significant ~istinction between 
direct and indirect aid, since so long as the government entity 
drafting the program relates the aid that flows to religious 
institutions to the number of individuals who choose to use the 
private service, it does not matter that the check is written from the 
government directly to the religious institution.13B Thus, as Justice 
O'Connor argued in her concurring opinion in Mitchell v. Helms,139 
neutrality is assigned singular importance. It is not a stretch to say 
that, at least in cases of government aid to religious institutions, the 
test is one of facial neutrality plus a private "circuit breaker"-i.e., 
the money ostensibly flows to the religious institution because of the 
choices of private individuals. 140 Significantly, the "circuit breaker" 
element is connected to the Court's broader neutrality analysis. It 
is the private individual "choice" that makes a facially neutral 
program "entirely neutral. "141 
This begs the question, however, of what constitutes "true private 
choice" under the Court's analysis. The Court's answer to this 
question is significant because it involves a statistical sleight of 
hand that could potentially make all public schools the relevant 
comparison group to religious schools for purposes of government 
136 [d. 
138 This is especially true since the Court rolled the "entanglement" prong of the Lemon 
test into the "effects" prong. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997) (stating that "the 
factors we use to assess whether an entanglement is 'excessive' are similar to the factors we 
use to examine 'effect' "). 
137 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653. 
138 Mitchell v. Helms. 530 U.S. 793,816 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
139 [d. at 837-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
140 [d.; Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653. 
141 Zelman. 536 U.S. at 662. 
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aid programs, even in areas with no secular private schools or where 
such private schools cannot afford to take voucher students, so long 
as secular private schools would be included in the program if they 
existed.142 This makes the Court's new test an exercise in almost 
pure formalism. 143 If a program is neutral on its face-that is, it 
does not specify religious entities as beneficiaries-and there is 
some government or nonreligious private entity that the recipients 
could conceivably choose to go to for service, the test is met because 
the program is neutral on its face and provides "true private 
choice, "144 even ifvi~ually all funding going to private organizations 
goes to religious organizations.145 
If this really were neutral, and neutrality was an appropriate 
actuating principle under the Establishment Clause,146 the Court's 
approach would be perfectly acceptable. Conversely, if the Court's 
approach is not neutral, calling it neutral should give it no further 
power, and it should be adequately supported by some other 
principle.147 In fact, if the Court's approach is not neutral, having 
the Court pronounce its neutrality is especially dangerous because 
the Court would simply be placing the label of neutrality on analysis 
that is neither neutral nor likely to lead to "neutral" results and 
using the label to validate its approach. The Court could call its 
undergirding principle "Ralph" and it would have the same 
descriptive accuracy.U8 In fact, "Ralph" might be more descriptively 
142 1d. at 696·98 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
143 1d. at 689 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "espoused criteria of neutrality in 
offering aid, and in private choice in directing it, are shown to be nothing but examples of 
verbal formalism"). 
144 1d. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (using term "true private choice"). 
145 1d. at 696-702 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
146 See supra notes 81-126 and accompanying text (suggesting that neutrality is not 
appropriate as central actuating principle under Establishment Clause). 
147 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacy of neutrality as sole 
principle). 
148 I am reminded of Alfred Kahn's famous substitution of the term "recession" for the 
word "banana" (he later used "kumquat") after President Carter had asked advisors not to use 
the term "recession" (Kahn was a member of the Carter administration). Peter Carlson, Yes, 
We Have No Banana, NEWARKSTAR-LEOOER, Feb. 11,2001, at 001. Of course, the distinction 
between that brilliant and comical substitution and the one suggested herein (aside from the 
latter not being brilliant) is that there is at least some "objective" defInition of the term 
"recession" that economists can agree upon-levels in certain economic indicators that mean 
we are in a recession. William Neikirk, Economy Remains Largely Stagnant, Jobless Rate 
Up as Payrolls Show 2nd Straight Dip, Cm. TlUB., Nov. 2, 2002, at 1 (defIning recession as 
HeinOnline -- 38 Ga. L. Rev. 517 2003-2004
2004] ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND NEUTRALITY 517 
accurate because one would still have to determine what the essence 
of Ralphness is, and the nature of the term does not suggest that it 
has any extra power or reality until it is defined. 
This might seem a bit tongue-in-cheek (and it is, to a point), but 
it demonstrates the serious problems with claims to neutrality. 
Since there is no neutral foundation or baseline that can be used to 
prove that something is "truly" neutral, neutrality is nothing more 
than a buzzword and a dangerous one at that, because it implies 
that the supposedly neutral approach should be taken more 
seriously because it is actually neutral. 149 Legal tests and 
definitions of neutrality do not make an approach neutral-they are 
simply tests or definitions and neutrality is nothing but extra 
baggage. 150 As was explained above, this does not mean that 
conceptions of neutrality-such as Douglas Laycock's substantive 
neutrality151-are not useful tools, but it does mean that they are 
not neutral and should gain no additional validity from the use of 
that term. 152 
This suggests that the Court's formal neutrality approach is 
especially dangerous, because the formalistic approach leaves little 
room for introspection, and its very nature makes it less likely to 
account for nuances or context. Supporting such a rigid regime with 
a concept that cannot be proven is particularly perilous, since once 
the formalistic test controls outcomes, there will be little 
opportunity to adapt to varied circumstances without sacrificing the 
clarity such formalistic tests are intended to create. Thus, courts 
applying the test must either rigidly apply a test that has never 
adequately justified itself because it is based on a non-existent 
principle, attempt to modify the test in its application to varied 
circumstances without the help of a useful guiding principle, or in 
the case of the Supreme Court, abandon stare decisis and either 
"sustained decline of at least six months in gross domestic product, the total output of the 
economy's goods and services"). 
149 See supra notes 81-126 and accompanying text (defIning neutrality). 
160 Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions, supra note 13, at 325-31. 
151 Laycock, supra note 3, at 1001-06. 
152 See supra notes 81-126 and accompanying text (discussing danger of relying on one 
theory of neutrality). 
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overturn the decisions giving rise to the approach or apply the 
approach in a manner that goes against its underlying purpose. 153 
A response to this line of reasoning might be that none of this is 
relevant if the Court's approach is "truly" neutral. I will respond to 
this argument next. My response will proceed in three parts. First, 
I will look at whether the individual beneficiaries of the program in 
Zelman had "true private choice."154 Second, I will examine whether 
the notion of a private circuit breaker can make a government 
funding program "neutral" where that program ultimately gives a 
disproportionate amount of public money meant for private entities 
to religious institutions. As will be seen the answer to this question 
is related to the first question, even if one accepts the notion that 
neutrality exists and that it consists of treating both religious and 
nonreligious individuals and institutions the same. 155 Finally, I will 
explore whether the "facial neutrality" of a law-the fact that a law 
does not distinguish between potential recipients within the broad 
class of recipients eligible for aid_156has anything to do with 
neutrality as an actuating principle for Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. 
In Zelman, the Court found that the parents of the students in 
the Cleveland School District, the private "circuit-breakers" in this 
case, had real individual choice regarding where to send their 
children.157 In finding this "true" choice, the Court went beyond the 
private school options the parents had and included several public 
school options. ISS Thus, government-run programs became part of 
the field of options the Court considered. Arguably, a program 
would be neutral and parents would have "true" choices even if one 
hundred percent of the money going to private entities went to 
163 Some would argue that is exactly what the Court did in Mitchell and Zelman. See 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,688 (2002) (Souter, J., concurring); Mitchell v. 
Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 837 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 899-900 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
154 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653. 
155 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
168 This might be called "verbal neutrality" and contrasted with actual neutrality, i.e., with 
provable neutrality if there is such a thing. Similarly, Justice Souter has used the term 
"verbal formalism" to describe the Court's approach. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 689 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
157 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653; id. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
158 [d. at 653; id. at 663 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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religious entities or if the only private choices parents had were 
religious. 159 This would seemingly be so even if the resulting 
government-funded regime put nonreligious private programs at a 
competitive disadvantage and led to religious institutions funded by 
a single sect taking over a market for services. 160 
One argument in favor of so expanding the comparison group is 
that government is so pervasive161 that to exclude government-run 
programs-which are by their nature secular-from the comparison 
group would be to put religion at a disadvantage in the marketplace 
of ideas and programs.162 Yet this argument is something of a red 
herring. For example, religious groups have not generally had equal 
access to compete to run police or fire services, nor would one have 
thought (prior to Zelman) that religious organizations could compete 
to take over road services or state-run children and family services. 
Moreover, religious organizations could not administer a public 
school or a charter school that relies on public funds for its 
existence. The relevant comparison group in the context of a 
voucher program is thus private schools. 163 Such schools are the 
only relevant entities that are not government-run, wholly reliant 
on government funds, or subject to pervasive government regulation 
and oversight. 
The relevant statistics regarding private schools in the Cleveland 
area were skewed such that the bulk of the money passing through 
the voucher program into private hands went to religious schools, 
and parents who participated in the voucher aspect of the Cleveland 
program had few nonreligious options.16• More than 3,700 students 
participated in the voucher program, and of those, ninety-six 
159 [d. (Souter, J., dissenting). 
160 Cf Green, supra note 29, at 559·60 (suggesting that market will favor more established 
faiths with existing schools over less established faiths and that adherents offormer will have 
more options than adherents oflatter). 
181 See supra note 111 and accompanying text (noting increased governmental regulation 
in general). 
182 But see Laycock, supra note 3, at 1003 (arguing that secular programs should not be 
considered when determining whether government encourages or discourages religion simply 
because they are secular and noting that relevant comparison is between religious and 
antireligious government action). 
183 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645-48 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
1M [d. at 649·50 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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percent enrolled in religious schools.16s Forty-six of the fifty-six 
private schools participating in the program were religious 
schools. 166 Moreover, the nonreligious private schools were 
generally small and had fewer seats for voucher students.167 These 
figures are not unusual because religious schools make up a 
significantly larger proportion of private schools nationally than 
nonreligious schools. 168 
Rather than rehashing the debate regarding this data-a debate 
that played out between the various opinions in Zelman and in the 
law review literature-this Article will focus on the Court's 
characterization of the Cleveland program as an "entirely neutral" 
program of "true private choice ... 169 Let us assume for the moment 
that the Court's statistical sleight of hand was a valid comparison 
of apples to apples, and thus in addition to the 3,765 voucher 
students in the program, we can consider the 1,400 students who 
stayed in public school and received subsidized tutorial aid, the 
1,900 students enrolled in publically-funded community schools, and 
the 13,000 enrolled in public magnet schools. 170 The percentage of 
students attending religious schools drops to below twenty percent 
when the reference group shifts from 3,765 students to 20,000 
students.l7l In fact, if we were to include the entire Cleveland 
school system in the comparison group using the Zelman majority's 
approximate figure of 75,000,172 the percentage going to religious 
schools under the voucher program would be approximately 
4.85%.173 The 75,000 figure would represent all the "choices" 
165 [d. at 647. As Justice Souter points out in his dissent, the exact statisticis 96.6%. [d. 
at 703 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
168 [d. at 647. 
167 See id. at 650 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that, of the more than 3,700 participating 
voucher students, only 129 attended nonreligious private schools, and all such schools 
combined had a total of only 510 seats between kindergarten and eighth grade, including 
seats for non-voucher students). 
168 [d. at 657-58; see also Joseph M. O'Keefe, S.J., What Research Tells us About the 
Contributions of Sectarian Schools, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 425, 425 n.l (2001) ("According 
to the National Center for Educational Statistics, nearly 80 percent of all private schools are 
sectarian ... "). 
169 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662. 
170 [d. at 647. 
171 [d. at 659. 
172 [d. at 644. 
173 This figure was obtained by comparing Justice O'Connor's figure of 3,637 students 
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parents in the Cleveland District had (or could have assuming open 
enrollment at all Cleveland public schools).174 
Yet if parents choose to take advantage of the voucher program 
because of dissatisfaction with all public school options (including 
community schools), the inability to get into a magnet school, or 
failure to win a lottery slot at a community school, 175 the parent may 
have little choice but to send his or her children to religious schools 
or forego the voucher option entirely. 176 Ifparents in the area do not 
subscribe to the faith of any participating religious school, as is 
likely for nonbelievers and many religious minorities, they can make 
the same "choice" as their neighbors, who participate in the voucher 
program and who do subscribe to one of the represented faiths, only 
by sending their children to a religious school that may indoctrinate 
them in a faith with which the family disagrees or at the very least 
does not believe in. This choice hardly seems neutral. Nor does the 
Court's assurance that the program is neutral because it provides 
everyone with "true private choice" and does not discriminate on its 
face, provide much solace to a parent who desperately wants to 
provide the best education possible for her children but who is afraid 
that her children will be confronted daily with lessons and choices 
that are alien to the family's faith. 177 
This is the problem with neutrality. One person's neutrality is 
another's discrimination or favoritism, and if a court proclaims 
attending private religious schools under the voucher program to the overall number of 
75,000 (4.85% would represent 3,637.5 out of 75,000 students). Zelman, 536 U.S. at 664 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
174 The majority also mentions that suburban school districts could have participated in 
the program, but none chose to participate. [d. at 646-47. There are significant financial 
disincentives for suburban districts wishing to participate in the program because the 
districts would only receive a per pupil amount equaling the voucher amount plus the state's 
normal contribution, but this would not cover the per pupil expenditures in such districts 
because a significant amount of their funding comes from local property taxes. [d. at 707 n.17 
(Souter, J., dissenting). 
176 [d. at 646 (noting that admission to community schools is by lottery). 
178 [d. at 703-04 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
177 The fact that children may be exempted from religious classes does not alter the 
sectarian messages and pedagogy that pervade (appropriately so) at many religious schools, 
or the possible discrimination that outsider children may face in such environments. Cf 
FRANK S. RA VITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER AND DISCRIMINATION: THE CML RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS 
MINORITIES AND DISSENTERS 7-18 (1999) (discussing instances of religious discrimination and 
harassment aimed at religious minorities and dissenters that occurred in public schools which 
engaged in religious exercises in relatively homogeneous areas). 
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something to be neutral, there is no way of proving the proclamation 
to be true. The Rehnquist Court relies on "true private choice" and 
facial neutrality as the basis for demonstrating that a program is 
"entirely neutral."178 It is easy, however, to dispute the availability 
of "true private choice," and the facial neutrality of a program does 
not mean that the program is neutral or even that it was not 
designed to discriminate against religious minorities or to favor 
dominant religious groups in a given area.179 
Even if the Court was correct in concluding that parents had a 
choice of multiple, equally viable nonreligious options, the program 
is not neutral. The overwhelming amount of money flowing into 
private (i.e., not initially dependent on government for survival) 
hands flows to religious schools, as does the overwhelming number 
of students. 180 Unless the Court explains how the existence of "true 
private choice" under such circumstances is neutral, especially in 
light of the inequity in same-sect options between the 
denominational "haves" and "have nots," there is no reason to take 
the Court's word for it. The Court's reasoning is circular: neutrality 
equals private choice and facial neutrality because, if a program is 
facially neutral and provides private choice, it is neutral. The 
neutrality claim remains unsubstantiated. Without the claim to 
neutrality, however, the Court is left having to justify why religion 
is indistinct as a matter of constitutional law and why excluding 
only religion from the voucher program would exhibit hostility 
towards religion. The claim that the program is neutral allows the 
Court to evade significant doctrinal and conceptual problems. 
What if, on the other hand, a voucher program had a large 
number of participating nonreligious private schools?181 Would this 
program be neutral? Where would the line be drawn if private 
178 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653. 
178 Cf Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533-40 (993) 
(explaining that law can be facially neutral yet not neutral in its object, and that law in this 
case was designed to discriminate against religious group). 
180 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 696-704 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
181 Justice Souter suggests the constitutionality of such a program in his dissenting 
opinion in Zelman, but only if it provides a range of choices compatible with that in Witters, 
a highly unlikely and expensive possibility. [d. at 706-07. See Witters v. Wash. Dep't of 
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486-89 (986)(upholding voucher program because of range 
of choices). 
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choice is the sine qua non of neutrality so long as a program is 
neutral on its face? Seventy five percent religious schools? Fifty 
percent? Forty percent? What if seventy percent of the forty 
percent of participating schools that are religious belong to one 
denomination? What if one hundred percent belong to one religion? 
These questions can be answered-even if not with perfect 
precision-but not by claiming the programs or the answers to the 
questions are neutral. 1S2 This Article asserts that if there were a 
real range of choices available to parents within the voucher option, 
as was the case with the programs in ZobrestlS3 and Witters, lS4 the 
program would be constitutional. This is not because the private 
choice makes an otherwise biased program neutral, but rather 
because the effects of such a program do not give religion a 
disproportionate and substantial benefit.ls5 
C. GOOD NEWS CLUB V. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL lS6 
Good News Club presents another version of the Court's formal 
neutrality, again grounded in the notion that treating religion 
differently would be hostile to religion. 1S7 Good News Club derives 
from a long line of equal access cases that at least arguably have a 
more consistent pedigree than the aid cases. l88 Equal access cases 
are those where a religious organization seeks access to 
government-owned facilities or government-funded fora to which 
183 See infra notes 325-463 and accompanying text. 
183 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. I, 10-ll (1993). 
184 Witters, 474 U.S. at 486-89. 
185 See infra notes 325-463 and accompanying text. 
186 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
187 [d. at ll4, ll8-20. 
183 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763-64 (1995) 
(explaining that it is viewpoint discrimination to deny access to traditional public forum based 
on religious message). See generally, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors ofUniv. of Va., 
515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding guidelines that limit speech in public forums are 
unconstitutional); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) 
(explaining that denying churches access to school premises open to other groups violates free 
speech); Bd. of Ed. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (Equal Access Act, which prohibits 
exclusion of religious clubs from open school forums, is constitutional); Widmar v. Vincent, 
454 U.S. 263 (1981) (explaining that state could not exclude religious students group from 
using University facilities unless regulations were content neutral). 
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nonreligious entities have access. 189 The primary difference in Good 
News Club is that the forum the religious group sought access to 
was a central school that included an elementary school. 190 
I will note at the outset that I think all of the equal access cases 
up until Good News Club were correctly decided and that Good 
News Club, while a closer call, was also correctly decided, but not 
because the analysis or results were neutral or because religion 
should automatically be treated the same as non-religion. In fact, 
by automatically connecting the exclusion of the religious group with 
hostility to religion, and thus non-neutrality,191 the Court makes 
another leap that it fails to adequately support. 
Good News Club is in many ways a straightforward speech 
case. 192 The school district allowed a variety of non-curricular 
student groups access to school facilities when school was not in 
session.193 Both parties agreed that the district provided a limited 
public forum for a variety of groups at the school. 194 The religious 
club was denied access because the religious character of its 
meetings were the equivalent of religious instruction.195 The school 
district argued that the denial of access under such circumstances 
was in compliance with New York law. 196 It was specifically the 
group's deeply religious mission, as well as its proselytizing nature, 
that gave the school district pause. 197 Thus, from a free speech 
perspective, the issue was one of viewpoint discrimination rather 
than content discrimination. 198 
Content discrimination occurs when the government 
discriminates against or excludes an entire subject. Viewpoint 
189 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07. 
100 The school building included students from kindergarten to twelfth grade. Id. at 118. 
191 Id. at 114, 118-20. 
192 See id. at 106-12 (applying tests established in prior decisions involving Free Speech 
Clause of First Amendment). 
193 Id. at 102, 108. 
UN Id. at 108. The district, however, disputed the scope of the forum. Id. at 110-11. 
196 Id. at 103-04. 
196 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 (N.D.N.Y. 1998), rev'd 
633 U.S. 98 (2001). See N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 414 (McKinney 2000) (stating purposes for which 
schools may be opened for public use). 
197 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 103-04. See id. at 137-39 (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(describing activities of Club as "evangelical service of worship"). 
198 Id. at 107-10. 
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discrimination occurs when the government discriminates against 
speech based on the specific viewpoint involved. Thus, it would be 
content discrimination to exclude all religious speech from a public 
forum, but it would be viewpoint discrimination to exclude only 
speech from a Jewish perspective. Claims of content discrimination 
in a public forum give rise to strict scrutiny.199 Thus the district 
would need to demonstrate first, that it had a compelling 
governmental interest, and second, that its action was narrowly 
tailored to serve that compelling interest.2OO The Court has 
suggested that viewpoint discrimination in a public forum is 
presumed unconstitutional,201 but the Court did not answer this 
question in Good News Club,202 and there is some support for 
applying strict scrutiny to viewpoint discrimination, albeit especially 
strict scrutiny.203 Regardless, the line between content and 
viewpoint discrimination is somewhat blurred. 
The district argued that its compelling interest was compliance 
with the Establishment Clause because the group was intensely 
religious, believed in proselytizing, was run by outside adults, and, 
most importantly, was geared for elementary school students who 
are young and impressionable.20• Thus, this case had the potential 
to confront directly the issue of whether religion is constitutionally 
different from other aspects of life, but the majority passed on the 
opportunity to deeply analyze this question. Instead, the Court 
presumed that treating religion differently was hostile to religion 
and would send a message of hostility to students in the same way 
199 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995). See 
Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1279 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Content-
based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. Viewpoint-based restrictions receive even 
more critical judicial treatment.") (citations omitted). 
200 Church on the Rock, 84 F.3d at 1279. 
201 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors ofUniv. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995). 
202 533 U.S. at 112-13. 
203 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,544 (2001) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (implying 
discrimination based on viewpoint is subject to strict scrutiny); Church on the Rock, 84 F.3d 
at 1279 ("Content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. Viewpoint-based 
restrictions receive even more critical judicial treatment.") (citations omitted). The fact that 
the Court in Good News Club refused to decide whether viewpoint discrimination might be 
justified in order to prevent violations of the Establishment Clause in rare circumstances at 
least leaves the question open. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112-13. 
2fU Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113-16; id. at 137-39 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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the school feared the group's meetings would send a message of 
endorsement of religion to non-believing students. 205 
As the dissent points out, the group was connected to a national 
organization that focuses on getting a foothold with elementary-aged 
children precisely because they are young and impressionable.206 
Yet the majority argued that religious organizations are the same 
as other organizations, and to deny them the same rights as other 
organizations is to discriminate against religion or religious 
viewpoints-that is, to do so would be non-neutral.207 Therefore, 
differential treatment is not mandated by the Establishment Clause 
and indeed might violate that clause. 208 
Once again, the analysis boils down to formalism-this time with 
the aid of the Free Speech Clause. If religion is treated differently 
in a limited public forum, even in a sensitive context like an 
elementary school, this is viewpoint or content discrimination 
(depending on whether a specific viewpoint(s) or category of speech 
is focused upon). 209 Yet treating religion differently in a forum 
neutrally open to all student groups is never a compelling 
government interest, because such differential treatment is not 
required by the Establishment Clause. That clause requires religion 
be treated the same as non-religion.21o By assuming that religion 
must be treated the same as non-religion, the Court both sets up the 
claim of viewpoint discrimination and answers the compelling 
interest defense to that claim. 211 Yet beyond asserting that 
differential treatment in this context is hostility to religion, the 
Court never explains why religion should be treated the same as 
non-religion, and why differential treatment in this context is 
automatically non-neutral.212 This is akin to a longstanding critique 
of the Court's formal equality doctrine under the Fourteenth 
Amendment: Is treating differently situated groups the same 
206 Id. at 118-20. 
206 The mission of the club is reflected in the format of the club's meetings as described 
by Justice Souter in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 137-39 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
207 Id. at 111-12, 114, 118-20. 
208 Id. at 118-20. 
209 Id. at 106-12. 
210 This is certainly implicit in Good News Club. Id. at 112-20. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
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equality?213 The Court's formal neutrality, different-treatment-as-
hostility argument presumes that a differently situated (both 
textually and historically) classification is the same as every other 
classification for purposes of religion clause analysis.214 
Yet, as noted above,215 I think the general result in Good News 
Club was correct. How is it possible to reach this conclusion without 
at least accepting the idea that government needs to treat religion 
the same as non-religion in the equal access context? My reasoning, 
which will be explained in greater detail later in this Article,216 is 
that the policy allowing a variety of student groups to meet does not 
substantially facilitate religion as compared to non-religion. If it 
did, it would be perfectly acceptable to treat religion differently 
because of Establishment Clause concerns. Additionally, the 
facilitation approach proposed in this Article would not preclude the 
school from preventing completely equal access. For example, the 
school can limit the group's ability to advertise in the classroom (as 
opposed to bulletin boards) or can limit announcements over a 
generally available public address system to basic information about 
meeting times and locations, even if other groups are not so limited 
(and so long as all religious student groups have the same 
limitations).217 Perhaps most importantly, if the group begins to 
interfere with the rights of other students through organized 
proselytization or by overreaching in recruitment efforts, the school 
213 Cf T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race·Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1061, 
1087 (1991) ("Recognizing race validates the lives and experiences of those who have been 
burdened because of their race. White racism has made 'blackness' a relevant category in our 
society."); Frank S. Ravitch, Creating Chaos in the Name of Consistency: Affirmative Action 
and the Odd Legacy of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 101 DICK. L. REV. 281, 292·93 
(1997) ("[Tlo treat legislation aimed at remedying the effects of past or present discrimination 
directed at racial minorities and legislation meant to discriminate against those minorities 
as the same, one must completely divorce the legislation from its historical context and tum 
the debate into an ahistorical analysis of racial categorization. "); David A. Strauss, The Myth 
of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REv. 99, 105·06 (stating that race neutral policies "give 
weight" to disabilities that racism has genuinely created for African Americans). 
214 See Conkle, supra note 3, at 25 ("[TJhe doctrine of formal neutrality implies that 
religion is neither distinct nor distinctly important. Indeed, it implies that religion is 
virtually an irrelevancy, to be treated under the Constitution in the same way that race is 
treated under the Constitution."). 
216 See supra notes 190·91 and accompanying text. 
218 See infra notes 325-463 and accompanying text (examining Good News Club in light 
of proposed "facilitation test" for Establishment Clause cases). 
217 Id. 
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can revoke access. In situations where the group is favored by the 
school, an "as applied" challenge could be brought. 
The key is that the Good News Club result is correct, not because 
it is inherently neutral-many religious minorities might not have 
the numbers or the desire to form such clubs, and thus the result 
may favor religions with greater numbers or a greater will to 
proselytize21s-hut because the free speech concerns cannot be 
rebutted on these facts. Thus, precluding the group is not 
automatically hostile to religion, and allowing it to meet does not 
automatically favor religion. The concepts of hostility and 
favoritism, like neutrality, are quite manipulable and can vary 
depending on who is evaluating the claim. 
D. CAPITOL SQUARE REVIEW AND ADVISORY BOARD V. PINETTE219 
This case shares some of the features of the Good News Club 
case. In Capitol Square, the Ku Klux Klan brought suit after it was 
denied a permit to erect a large cross in a park area near the capitol 
building. 220 The area was considered a traditional public forum, 
where a variety of groups could place materials or speak out on a 
variety of issues.221 Thus, as with Good News Club,222 this case 
raised significant free speech issues.223 
The Court held that since the square was a public forum, the 
government would need to show a compelling governmental interest 
to support the exclusion of the croSS.224 This is because the state's 
actions constituted content discrimination.225 The Court 
acknowledged that compliance with the Establishment Clause could 
constitute a compelling government interest,226 but the state's action 
218 Cf Green, supra note 29, at 559-60 (suggesting that vouchers will favor groups with 
larger numbers and established schools over those with fewer numbers and lower support for 
sectarian schools). 
219 515 U.S. 753 (1995). 
220 Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 758 (plurality opinion). 
221 ld. 
222 See supra notes 186-218 and accompanying text. 
223 Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 760-63 (plurality opinion). 
224 ld. at 761. 
223 ld. 
226 ld. at 761-62. 
HeinOnline -- 38 Ga. L. Rev. 529 2003-2004
2004] ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND NEUTRALITY 529 
in this case was not mandated by the Establishment Clause.227 A 
plurality ofthe Court rejected what it referred to as the "transferred 
endorsement test,,228 advocated by Justice O'Connor in her 
concurring opinion. 229 This was the plurality's shorthand for the 
idea that the state may be liable for endorsement of religion if a 
reasonable observer would perceive the expression of private actors 
on public land as endorsed by the government.230 The plurality 
rejected the idea that actions of private individuals could be 
endorsed by government in a public forum, even if an outsider might 
mistake the private action for state action.231 
This case is easily resolved under the Free Speech Clause if 
religion must be treated the same as non-religion. If equal 
treatment between religion and everything else is the sine qua non 
of religion clause jurisprudence, the preclusion of the cross from a 
public forum would be hostility to religion.232 Thus, viewpoint or 
content discrimination based on the religious nature of the speech 
would be an obvious violation of both the Free Speech and 
Establishment Clauses. 233 
While I do not advocate the equal treatment view of the religion 
clauses, Capitol Square demonstrates that, even if equal treatment 
is the appropriate mode of analysis, it is not neutral. First, when a 
nonbeliever or a member of a religious minority passes the capitol 
square and sees a large cross, it is quite possible that the cross will 
be perceived as a symbol of majoritarian dominance even if the 
viewer realizes that the government did not put it Up.234 Second, 
since the majority religion in the United States is Christianity,236 
and proselytization is a component of a number of Christian 
227 1d. at 762-70. 
228 1d. at 767-68. 
229 1d. at 772 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
230 1d. at 764-70 (plurality opinion). 
231 1d. at 765. 
232 See ill. at 768 (stating that suppressing lawful displays would be a violation of free 
exercise or free speech). 
233 1d. at 765. 
234 Cf. ill. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that some citizens might perceive cross 
"as a message of exclusion-a statehouse sign calling powerfully to mind their outsider 
status"). 
235 FELDMAN, supra note 57, at 232. 
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denominations,236 it is likely that to the extent religious symbols are 
exhibited on the square and religious messages shared, the vast 
majority of the messages will be Christian,237 or at the very least 
reflective of mainstream Western religions.238 This may be 
compounded during the holidays because Christmas trees and 
appropriate "holiday" decorations may be displayed by 
government.239 The resulting message to nonbelievers and religious 
minorities may be, to use Justice O'Connor's language, "that they 
are outsiders and not full members of the political community.,,240 
While the reasonableness of such perceptions can be debated 
from a variety ofperspectives,241 the impact of the equal treatment 
approach is not neutral unless one first defines neutrality as equal 
treatment. This is apparently what the Court did, but the Court 
never demonstrated that its baseline was neutral. The Court 
quickly wrote off what it suggested were the unreasonable 
inferences that nonbelievers or religious minorities might draw from 
the display of the cross.242 Yet if the goal is neutrality, or for that 
matter equality, writing off alternative perceptions of the issue 
being analyzed hardly supports such goals. 
Significantly, this does not mean that Capitol Square was 
wrongly decided. As with Good News Club,243 it simply means that 
neither the result or the analysis was neutral. While I am troubled 
by the message that may be sent to nonbelievers and religious 
minorities when a big cross is set up next to a state capitol building, 
such is the nature of a public forum. As long as someone who 
wishes to post an upside-down cross or an antireligious message is 
free to do so in the square, and so long as none of the symbols are 
permanently left there, excluding specific religious symbols is 
content or viewpoint discrimination. The harder question is why the 
236 [d. 
237 [d. 
238 This is reflected in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) and County of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), where a creche (Lynch), and a Christmas tree and 
menorah (as well as a creche) <Allegheny) were the displays at issue. 
239 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573. 
240 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
241 Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 768-69 n.3 (plurality opinion). 
242 [d. at 765. 
243 See supra notes 186-218 and accompanying text. 
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Establishment Clause does not bar the symbols even if the Free 
Speech Clause protects them. As will be seen later, the answer is 
that the maintenance of a public forum does not substantially 
facilitate religion over non-religion, nor does it necessarily facilitate 
specific religions over others.244 The approach advocated herein 
would support "as applied" challenges in situations where a forum 
has essentially been taken over by a specific religion or by religion 
generally, or where it is administered in a manner that favors 
religion, antireligion, or a specific religion.245 As will be seen, the 
facilitation approach proposed herein has greater problems with 
government-sponsored holiday displays, and with privately 
sponsored holiday displays on government property where there is 
not a public forum, than with a privately sponsored religious display 
in a public forum. 246 Although an important issue, the argument for 
excluding the cross because of the obvious racist and antisemitic 
meaning attached to a cross erected by the Ku Klux Klan is beyond 
the scope of this Article. 247 
III. PRINCIPLES AND TESTS 
The notion that there is tension between the broad principles 
traditionally used in Establishment Clause cases and the results in 
those cases is not new.248 Moreover, the relationship between broad 
principles and the tests used under the Establishment Clause has 
been well explored. Without reinventing the wheel, it is useful to 
explore the principles often used in Establishment Clause cases and 
the notion that it would be far better to rely either on a variety of 
narrow principles or upon doctrinal tests that mayor may not be 
anchored to any specific principle.249 
2" See infra notes 325-463 and accompanying text. 
m See infra notes 325-463 and accompanying text. 
:ue See infra notes 325-463 and accompanying text. 
247 See Capitol Square Review Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 797-98 (1995) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating icon of intolerance also violates Establishment Clause 
because Clause prohibits official sponsorship of irreligious messages as well as religious 
messages). 
248 Marshall, supra note 51, at 500. 
249 But see Greenawalt, supra note 4, at 329 ("As I have here defmed tests, a court may 
do without one, measuring relevant factors against basic constitutional values but not offering 
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While the concept of neutrality has always been lurking in 
religion clause jurisprudence, other principles, such as separation 
and accommodation, have also played an important part.250 
Moreover, these principles did not automatically conflict with earlier 
Courts' more ethereal concepts of neutrality. 251 In fact, separation 
was initially framed as furthering neutrality.252 The current 
development of neutrality as both the overarching broad principle 
and the test for deciding cases is far different from the earlier notion 
of neutrality as an overarching but ethereal principle that needed 
something more, such as separationism, to make it function. 253 In 
this earlier context, the formal equality of religion was relevant, but 
it was not equated with neutrality in the way it is in Zelman and 
Mitchell. 254 
This section will assert that none of the other broad principles 
traditionally discussed in the religion clause context work as broad 
principles. Thus, separation, accommodation, equality, and liberty 
all may be valuable in some contexts, but some of these concepts are 
too vague to be of great use beyond platitudes and buzzwords, while 
others suffer some of the same problems as neutrality. This Article 
does not address nonpreferentialism255 because it has never been 
directly adopted by the Court, although an argument could be made 
that aspects of the Rehnquist Court's formal neutrality come closer 
to nonpreferentialism than it might appear at first glance.256 
any linguistic formula for its resolution."). This Article asserts that rigid adherence to 
overarching and universal principles may lead to some of the same problems identified by 
Professor Greenawalt. 
2SO See supra notes 52-247 and accompanying text. 
251 Cf. Laycock, supra note 25, at 46 (asserting that "separation" and "neutrality" are 
incorrect labels and noting that it is "tactical mistake to contrast these labels so sharply"). 
252 [d. at 46. 
253 See id. at 63-65 (stating that Court has been inconsistent with theories and that 
theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive). 
2M Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 
793,809-10 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
255 For a discussion of nonpreferentialism, see generally Cord, supra note 43 (supporting 
nonpreferentialism) and Smith, supra note 43 (discussing nonpreferentialism in response to 
Professor Laycock's repudiation of concept). 
258 The Mitchell plurality's approval of potentially wide-ranging nonpreferential aid 
demonstrates the implicit connection between formal neutrality and nonpreferential aid. 
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-10 (plurality opinion). Of course, nonpreferential aid within a 
program open to secular entities is not the same as nonpreferentialism, which would allow 
government to favor religion generally so long as no sect was favored over others. Yet the 
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Once the various principles are explored, the Article proposes 
that something similar to Douglas Laycock's substantive 
neutrality,257 tweaked with aspects of separationism and 
accommodationism, should prevail as a guiding principle for 
Establishment Clause purposes, but divorced from the term 
neutrality and wary of any such claim. The proposed principle will 
act as a narrow rather than broad principle in applying the test 
proposed later in this Article.258 
Writing about principles such as separationism and 
accommodationism is hard to do without either spending hundreds 
of pages reinventing the wheel or oversimplifying the concepts. I 
fear that I may do the latter to an extent, but given the focus ofthis 
Article, it is necessary in order to address these important concepts 
which do have a role to play in the test proposed later in this 
Article,259 while at the same time keeping the Article focused and 
manageable. As will be seen, none of the functional principles has 
a clear pedigree, and even principles which have a strong historical 
pedigree, such as religious liberty, are vague and hard to define. 
A. SEPARATIONISM 
In Everson v. Board of Education,260 the Court laid down its 
separationist mantra: 
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First 
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can 
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or 
result of Zelman could be similar to that under nonpreferentialism in some contexts. In some 
areas, the only private beneficiaries of government aid might be religious entities, and in 
others, the primary private beneficiaries may be religious entities. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 
696-98 (Souter, J., dissenting) (saying majority reasoning fmds neutrality only in setting 
eligibility, not in actually using public money). This would apparently be acceptable so long 
as the formal neutrality test is met and there is no favoritism as between religious 
beneficiaries. 
2li7 Laycock, supra note 3, at 1001-06. 
258 See infra notes 325-463 and accompanying text. 
2li9 [d. 
260 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor 
influence a person to go to or to remain away from 
church against his will or force him to profess a belief or 
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, 
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any 
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any 
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be 
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or 
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the 
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice 
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against 
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a 
wall of separation between Church and State."261 
Both the majority and the dissenters in Everson agreed that the 
above statements reflected the proper approach to religion clause 
questions.262 Their disagreement was over the application of that 
approach. The majority used it to uphold a program that provided 
bus service for parochial school students under a general school 
transportation program.,263 while the dissent believed the program 
breached the wall of separation.264 Interestingly, the Court also 
referred to neutrality as a guiding principle in the case.265 
As a matter of history, the Court almost certainly overstated its 
case by relying heavily on an obscure letter written by Jefferson,266 
but the notion of separation was reflected elsewhere in the framer's 
writings.267 The historical argument for strict separationism is 
rather weak when one considers all the variables involved in 
261 Id. at 15-16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,164 (1878». 
262 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16; id. at 19, 28 (Jackson, J., dissenting); id. at 29, 31-32 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
263 Id. at 16-18. 
264 Id. at 44-58 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
266 See id. at 18 (stating that First Amendment "requires the state to be neutral in its 
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers"). 
266 PmLIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 3 (2002); Arlin M. Adams & 
Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1559, 1596 (1989). 
267 Green, supra note 24, at 1121-25. 
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gleaning the intent of the many framers and ratifying conventions, 
as well as the interpretations and practices of early government 
entities in the United States.2G8 Yet for the same reasons the case 
is not any stronger for the competing theories as a historical 
matter.2G9 If we look to the broad intent of the framers and interpret 
historical practices and principles in light of to day's diverse society 
and massive government, the argument for separation may be 
stronger.270 This has been called soft-originalism in other 
contexts.271 
This Article does not attempt to take sides in this historical 
debate, because even if we accept that separationism is at some 
level a guiding principle-as this Article does-it is, like neutrality, 
a principle in search of a baseline. The difference is that separation 
need not make the same type of claim that neutrality does. 
Separation can be a broad or limited concept depending on how we 
define it.272 There can be degrees of separation. Neutrality, on the 
other hand, is not provably neutral regardless of how broadly or 
narrowly we define it.273 
Scholars and the Court have long recognized that "strict 
separation" is impossible, because at least at the margins there is 
bound to be some interaction between religion and government. 274 
Strict separation would amount to establishing a purely secular 
state, where secularism is at least implicitly encouraged and favored 
and religion banished from the public square and public life. 275 
268 HAMBURGER, supra note 266, at 3; Adams & Emmerich, supra note 266, at 1596. 
269 Adams & Emmerich, supra note 266, at 1596; Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid 
to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARy L. REV. 875, 875-902, 913-
19 (1986); Theodore Sky, The Establishment Clause, the Congress and the Schools: An 
Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REv. 1395, 1401-03, 1464-65 (1966). 
270 Green, supra note 24, at 1121-25. 
271 Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 311, 313 
(1996). 
272 See generally Laycock, supra note 25; Gedicks, supra note 25. 
213 See supra notes 81-126 and accompanying text (discussing meaning of neutrality). 
274 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,614 (1971) ("Our prior holdings do not call 
for a total separation of church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. 
Some relationship between government and religious organizations is inevitable."). 
275 Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 249 
(1994); cf McConnell, supra note 40, at 14 ("Excluding religious institutions and individuals 
from government benefits to which they would be entitled under neutral and secular criteria, 
merely because they are religious, advances secularism, not liberty."). 
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Moreover, it would be impossible-or at the very least, highly 
impractical-to maintain. 
Another possibility is to use a narrow concept, such as 
prohibiting direct aid to religious institutions, as a limit. 276 Thus, 
separation would be defined by a context and a test, not by some 
broad notion of absolute separation. The current Court has rejected 
or muddied (depending on one's perspective) the long-standing 
prohibition on direct aid to religious institutions.277 At the very 
least, the prohibition against direct aid has little of the force it used 
to have since the circuit breaker concept of "true individual choice" 
has been interpreted to allow the government to write the check 
directly to a religious entity so long as the amount of the check is 
determined by the number of people who decide to enroll.278 Even 
if it were revived, the direct aid version of separation only applies 
in the context of government aid programs, and even then it is more 
of a formalistic test than a guiding principle. 
Another possibility is to use separation as a guiding principle in 
some contexts, but not others.279 Thus, separation would be used in 
the school prayer context, the public school curriculum context, and 
perhaps the direct aid context, but not in equal access or indirect aid 
cases. This is not too far from the current situation.280 The current 
situation, though, is more a result of the positions of the swing 
voters on the Court, none of whom take a consistent separationist 
position, than of a dedication to separation on these issues. 
Depending on which baseline one picks for separation, in given 
contexts it could function as a narrow test, a broad principle that 
urges as much separation between the government and religion as 
possible, or somewhere in between. Separation is less problematic 
276 See Green, supra note 24, at 1120-21 (discussing "no-aid principle" and asserting that 
it is not only value "furthered by separationism"). 
277 See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.s. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 
U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
278 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 815-16 (plurality opinion) (stating that Establishment Clause 
does not require formality of passing aid through hands of private individuals). 
279 See generally Gedicks, supra note 25 (discussing separation). 
280 Compare Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639 (upholding voucher program where bulk. of money 
flowing to private school hands went to religious schools), with Santa Fe Independent School 
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 290 (2000) (finding prayer at high school football games 
unconstitutional, where games are school-sponsored and school district drafted and 
implemented "student initiated" prayer policy). 
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than neutrality because some degree of separation may be achieved. 
Separation by itself, however, is problematic at the practical level 
because one must still choose where and how to implement it, and 
short of a draconian absolute separation which is hard to 
implement, troubling from a policy perspective, and contrary to the 
historical idea of the religion clauses, separation is a malleable 
concept that may function best if implemented as a narrow 
principle. The test set forth later in this Article is guided in part by 
the benefits of keeping some form of separation in the religion 
clause equation, but not a form that all separationists will be happy 
about. 281 
B. ACCOMMODATIONISM 
Like separation, accommodation can arguably function both at 
the level of a broad principle and as a narrow principle, or as a facet 
of a doctrinal test. 282 Accommodationist arguments are most 
common under the Free Exercise Clause.283 In that context, 
accommodationism would support exemptions from laws of general 
applicability.284 However, accommodationism can also be used in 
the Establishment Clause context.285 In fact, one might justify the 
results of the three cases discussed in Part II of this Article on 
accommodationist principles. When accommodationism functions 
in the Establishment Clause context as a broad principle of strict 
accommodationism, for lack of a better term, it becomes hard to 
distinguish from nonpreferentialism.286 
Moreover, even where accommodationism functions as a 
background principle, as it arguably did in Lynch v. Donnelly287 and 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU,288 the results can be troubling both for 
devoutly religious people and for nonbelievers. In those cases, 
281 See infra notes 325-463 and accompanying text (discussing facilitation test). 
282 See generally McConnell, supra note 40 (exploring connection between accommodation 
and broad concept of liberty). 
283 [d. at 24-27. 
284 [d. 
285 [d. at 29-32; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970). 
286 See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text (discussing nonpreferentialism). 
287 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (plurality opinion). 
288 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
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Christmas was declared to be essentially a general or commercial 
holiday with religious roots, at least to the extent that it is 
"celebrated" in public life,289 and in Lynch the religious impact of a 
creche-the depiction of the birth of Jesus-while acknowledged, 
was deemed sufficiently minimized because it was included with 
secular symbols of the "holiday season. "290 In Allegheny, the 
religious impact of a Menorah was somehow offset by its location 
near a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty.291 The reasoning 
and results in these cases have been decried by many scholars, both 
secular and religious, and I need not rehash the rich arguments 
here. The salient points are that these holdings trivialize a sacred 
holiday for devout Christians py trying to accommodate public 
recognition of it without crossing the line into government support 
of a particular religion,292 and at the same time insult non-
Christians by suggesting that Christ's Mass is somehow our holiday 
too, even if we do not celebrate it.293 Moreover, Allegheny suggests 
that a clearly religious symbol, the Menorah, can be displayed by 
government when placed next to a Christmas tree and a sign 
saluting liberty.294 Much as the commercial version of Christmas is 
offensive to devout Christians, the minimization of the religious 
nature of a religious object is degrading to the religious meaning of 
the Menorah. 295 
Accommodationism does not work well by itself in the 
Establishment Clause context. This is not because it is not 
feasible-nonpreferentialism is feasible-but because, short of 
moving toward nonpreferentialism, accommodationism requires 
distinctions to be made that allow government to engage in or foster 
289 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680, 683. 
290 [d. at 680-86; cf. Steven D. Smith, Separation and the ·SecularD: Reconstructing the 
Disestablishment Decision, 67 'rEX. L. REv. 955,1002-03 (1989) (asserting that critics of Lynch 
decision misunderstood Lynch majority's secularization position: position did not result from 
conclusion that creche lost its religious meaning because of its placement; rather, majority 
employed broad notion of "secular" and found that religious symbol served secular purpose 
in context involved). 
291 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573. 
292 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 711-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
293 [d. 
294 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573. 
296 [d. at 633-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 
643-44 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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religious activities while somehow denouncing the religious nature 
or impact of those activities. An example is turning religious 
symbols or rituals into a form of ceremonial deism in order to 
accommodate them without acknowledging that government is 
sponsoring or performing a religious function. 
To the extent that accommodationism is connected to notions of 
formal equality between religion and non-religion, it may be a more 
plausible approach than neutrality. However, it would not by itself 
solve the problems raised in the NSF funding hypothetical above or 
address the concern that the formal equality approach ignores the 
disparities between more dominant and minority religions thus 
giving dominant religions in given areas a competitive edge and a 
preferred status. 296 Still, accommodationism has a role to play 
under the Establishment Clause and a potentially important role to 
play in the Free Exercise Clause context. 297 Yet rover-reliance on 
accommodationism under the Establishment Clause might force the 
big square peg of religion into narrow round holes in order to 
maintain some minimal level of separation. As will be seen, 
however, a narrow view of accommodationism, together with a 
narrow view of separationism, may serve as a useful animating 
principle. 
c. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
Michael McConnell and others have made powerful arguments 
that religious liberty is the guiding principle under the religion 
clauses.298 Of course, this does not answer the obvious question: 
What is religious liberty? The problem is that religious liberty is 
more like neutrality than separation or accommodation. 
The concept of religious liberty must struggle with its underlying 
epistemic claim: that there is some way of knowing what religious 
liberty is. Yet every school of thought that has addressed the 
religion clauses claims to be promoting religious liberty. at some 
296 See supra notes 115-26 and accompanying text (posing NSF hypothetical). 
297 See McConnell, supra note 40, at 24-27 (discussing role of accommodation). 
298 See McConnell, supra note 40, at 1 (asserting that religious liberty "is the central value 
and animating purpose of the Religion Clauses," and that religious accommodation often 
furthers religious liberty). 
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level, and some view their approach as synonymous with religious 
liberty.299 Thus, religious liberty must either be tied to some 
baseline or viewed simply as an aspiration to be fulfilled by the 
doctrine or theory du jour. Yet whatever baseline or results one 
argues are consistent with religious liberty, there can be a 
competing baseline. 
For example, let us take what should be the easiest situation for 
promoting the religious liberty principle: Free Exercise Clause 
Exemptions. It is arguable that the reasoning and results in 
Goldman v. Weinberger,SOO Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass'n,SOl and Employment Division v. Smith,302 to name 
just a few cases, are inconsistent with religious liberty. The 
reasoning is by now standard (and I would argue valid). That is, 
laws of "general applicability" sometimes interfere with religious 
practice, and in fact, are more likely to interfere with the religious 
practices of those who are not in the religious mainstream.303 This 
is attenuated by the fact that the dominant religion in the United 
States is heavily faith-based (although that is a highly 
oversimplified description) and that many minority religions are 
practice oriented. These practices are not preferences in most 
contexts,304 but rather central to the faiths of the practitioners. 
Thus, laws of general applicability should not be allowed to interfere 
with these practices without a compelling governmental interest 
299 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 40, at 1 (noting that permissible accommodations are 
based on, consistent with, and further religious liberty). 
300 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
SOl 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
302 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
303 Cf, Smith, 494 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(noting that courts need not "turn 
a blind eye to the severe impact of a State's restrictions on the adherents of a minority 
religion"). 
304 See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 508 (noting that wearing yarmulke is akin to "personal 
preference"). 
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and narrow tailoring.805 To find otherwise is to interfere with a 
central aspect of religious liberty. 306 
Yet there is an easy response that also claims to be consistent 
with religious liberty: that the Free Exercise Clause absolutely 
protects religious faith and belief. Still, laws of general applicability 
do not require religious exemptions, even though this might be 
helpful to some religious practitioners. Everyone has the same level 
of religious liberty, but unfortunately, some religions or religious 
practices will be more impacted by laws of general applicability than 
others, and there is no absolute right to religious liberty that trumps 
the interest in maintaining social order.307 Each of the above 
approaches could claim that it is consistent with the principle of 
religious liberty. 
Let us look at another example, this one based on Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe.30s In Santa Fe, the Court held, 
among other things, that prayer at public school football games 
coerced students to participate in a religious exercise.809 This is a 
serious interference with religious liberty. The school argued, 
however, that excluding the prayer would impose on the free speech 
rights, and implicitly on the religious liberty, of the students who 
wanted to pray under the "student initiated" prayer policy.3lO Each 
of these is a claim about religious liberty, and each is a potentially 
viable argument. As will be seen in Part IV, I think Santa Fe was 
correctly decided, but not because the result was inherently more 
supportive of religious liberty than the alternative. 811 
At its broadest, religious liberty is more a platitude than a 
principle. When we try to define it, we are faced with competing 
30Ii I would further assert that this requires more than the weak application of the 
compelling interest test that was prevalent in the years following Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963). See William P. Marshall, What IB the Matter With Equality?: An Assessment of 
the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 IND. 
L.J. 193, 195·196 (2000) (acknowledging that Smith was not major shift from results of earlier 
post-Sherbert cases even if it was major shift in doctrine). 
306 See McConnell, Bupra note 40, at 24·27 (discussing general purposes of religious 
accommodation). 
307 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
306 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
309 Id. at 311.12. 
310 Id. at 302, 309.10. 
311 See infra notes 325-463 and accompanying text. 
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and contestable notions of what religious liberty is, and thus the 
concept can not rely on a provable baseline of "liberty," but rather 
must rely on other concepts or doctrinal tests to fill the gap. 
Through accommodation, the principle of religious liberty operates 
best in the Free Exercise Clause context, but even there, competing 
views of religious liberty preclude one baseline of religious liberty 
from being "the" correct view. 
I like the lofty goal of religious liberty. It sounds good. But then 
again, it is my concept of religious liberty that I like, and I doubt 
that others, such as Justice Scalia, share my concept of religious 
liberty. I have no means, though, to prove that my view of religious 
liberty is any more correct than his view. I can argue based on other 
principles or history that his view of religious liberty is wrong, but 
I cannot prove that it is any less or any more "religious liberty" than 
my view without some super-baseline of religious liberty (or perhaps 
an absolutely decisive historical record, which does not exist here). 
D. EQUALITY 
Like religious liberty, an approach to religion clause analysis 
grounded in the quest for equality sounds good. If it could be 
delivered, all religions would be treated equally and religion would 
be treated equally with nonreligion. Scholars who have advocated 
an equality-based approach to the religion clauses are not naive 
enough to think that 'such a state of perfect equality could exist,312 
just as scholars who have advocated a neutrality-based approach are 
not naive enough to think that perfect and incontestable neutrality 
could exist.313 Yet, as with neutrality, one person's equality is 
another's hostility. Do we measure equality by government 
purpose? By the facial equality of government action? By the 
effects of government action? Is treating similarly situated groups 
the same "equality," even if doing so has a disparate impact based 
312 See generally Brownstein, supra note 13, at 246-47 (discussing equality); Eisgruber & 
Sager, supra note 41 (arguing for equality standard). 
313 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 3, at 994 ("We can agree on the principle of neutrality 
without having agreed on anything at all."). 
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on social factors? Is treating differently situated groups the same 
"equality"? 
Various equality-based approaches have attempted to answer 
these questions, and some are quite impressive in their intellectual 
rigor and potentially of great use.314 Yet, they all rest on creaky 
theoretical claims. As with Laycock's substantive neutrality, which 
as we saw is quite valuable but not provably neutral,315 equality-
based approaches may be valuable, but whether they foster equality, 
and what equality is, remain open questions. This makes the 
"equality" garnered by the application of such principles contestable 
even among those who accept a given approach, and of course there 
are a variety of "equality based approaches." As will be seen in Part 
IV, one such approach, Eisgruber and Sager's "Equal Regard" 
approach,316 is useful in framing the facilitation test and its Free 
Exercise Clause counterpart.317 
The important point here is that equality, like religious liberty, 
can function as a broad amorphous principle that is never clearly 
definable or reachable, but it cannot do the work of answering 
questions in a variety of contexts without the help of some other 
narrow principle.318 To the extent the Court has tied formal equality 
to formal neutrality in its more recent cases, the results have hardly 
been equal for many religious minorities and nonbelievers.319 If the 
Court is relying on another principle, such as majoritarianism or 
nonpreferentialism, some of the results in recent religion clause 
cases may make more sense (even if they are disagreeable), but 
using neutrality and equality in the way the Court recently has only 
masks the fact that it is relying on other principles. 
To the extent that equality under the religion clauses is 
construed to require formal neutrality between religion and non-
314 See generally Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 41 (attempting to answer such questions 
from perspective of equality). 
316 See supra notes 81-126 and accompanying text (analyzing neutrality approach). 
316 See generally Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 41 (formulating equality approach). 
317 See infra notes 325-463 and accompanying text. 
318 Cf Laycock, supra note 3, at 996 ("[E) quality is an insufficient concept. . . . Claims 
about equality, or neutrality, always require further specification: equality with respect to 
what classification, for what purpose, in what sense, and to what extent?"). 
319 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 685-86(2002) (Souter, J., dissenting); Green, 
supra note 29, at 558-60. 
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religion, it is subject to all of the problems pointed out earlier.320 
This Article will argue, however, that equality does have a role to 
play in religion clause jurisprudence. That role is the opposite of the 
role equality plays in the Court's formal neutrality approach. 
Equality comes into play because we should consider the results of 
even facially neutral government actions (including those that 
utilize private intermediaries) in order to determine whether those 
actions give substantial benefits to some religions over others or to 
religion over non-religion.321 
Needless to say, this focuses a great deal more on the effects of 
government activity than the current Court seems willing to do in 
the aid and equal access contexts,322 but as will be seen in Part IV, 
the impact of the effects focus is greater in the aid context. To the 
extent the approach proposed below (and the test it supports) uses 
equality, it does not do so in an absolute way, and it acknowledges 
that any claim to equality is simply based on a construction of that 
term that deals with significant disparities in the effects of 
government actions.323 The facilitation test makes no claim to have 
found the answer to the meaning or achievement of religious 
equality.324 
IV. THE FACILITATION TEST 
It should be clear by now that this Article does not advocate 
reliance on specific broad principles, especially for purposes of 
developing legal doctrine, but various principles can inform the 
development of useful doctrine. For this to happen, the principles 
must be honestly confronted. This requires acknowledgment that 
some principles are simply social or judicial constructions that have 
no claim to accuracy or truth. Thus, narrower principles that do not 
320 See supra notes 1·247 and accompanying text. 
321 See infra notes 325-463 and accompanying text. 
322 See supra notes 127·247 and accompanying text. 
323 See infra notes 325-463 and accompanying text. 
324 As with neutrality, this Article asserts that there is no clear answer to the question: 
What is religious equality? Moreover, there is no gauge which can prove that we have 
achieved it-at least no gauge that is not attached to some artificial construction of the 
meaning of equality, such as formal equality. Compare supra notes 313·24 and accompanying 
text, with supra 52·247 and accompanying text. 
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suggest universal truth and which are readily subject to degrees of 
implementation without undermining their meaning are more 
useful in developing legal tests. 
At the base though, the tests themselves are central to the 
practical meaning of the religion clauses, even if that meaning has 
become quite confused as a result of the application of such tests. 
Thus, which test a court uses-whether the Lemon/Agostini test,325 
the endorsement test,326 the coercion test,327 the tradition test,328 or 
the Court's new formal neutrality test (ostensibly part of the 
Agostini test)329-can have a significant impact on the meaning of 
the Establishment Clause. Yet how a given test is applied may be 
more important than the choice oftests,330 and each of these choices 
can be affected by the principles one believes undergird the 
Establishment Clause (or subconsciously assumes undergird that 
clause).331 
This interplay between principles and tests is important and 
complex, but where does it leave us if we accept the idea that most 
broad principles are impossible to pin down and that there is no 
super-principle that enables us to choose correctly between 
competing narrow principles because there is no way to gauge 
"correctness" in this context? Ironically, it leaves us with doctrinal 
tests that must necessarily be divorced from anyone principle 
325 The classic Lemon test, set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971), 
was modified in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,222-23 (1997), with the Court folding the 
"entanglement" prong of Lemon into the "effects" prong and changing the Court's earlier focus 
on divisiveness as an element of entanglement. 
326 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
327 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (noting that Constitution guarantees 
that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion). 
328 See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (discussing tradition test). 
329 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 630, 651-53 (2002)(discussingCourt decisions 
that approve neutral programs). 
330 Justice O'Connor's perplexing application of the Endorsement Test is a prime example 
of the importance of how one applies a test. The Endorsement Test has the potential to 
seriously address the impact of religious establishments, or alleged religious establishments, 
on religious minorities. Yet, her application of that test in cases like Lynch and Allegheny 
does not necessarily bare out that potential. KENNETH KARsT, LAw's PROMISE, LAw's 
EXPRESSION 147-60 (1993); Alan Brownstein, A Decent Respect for Religious Liberty and 
Religious Equality: Justice O'Connor's Interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment, 32 MCGEORGE L. REv. 837, 845-57 (2001). 
331 See supra notes 248-324 and accompanying text. 
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because of the impossibility of absolutely realizing that principle but 
which can be informed by multiple principles once we realize and 
acknowledge the limitations inherent in those principles. Thus, this 
Article proposes a test for Establishment Clause cases that I assert 
can work in the varied Establishment Clause contexts such as 
school prayer, government display of religious symbols, government 
aid, and access to government facilities and programs. The test does 
not work because it fits anyone broad principle, but because it is 
informed by a number of principles that ebb and flow in their import 
depending on the context.332 
As will be seen, the test is informed by notions of liberty, 
equality, separation, and accommodation. None of these principles 
serves as the overarching principle. This is where Douglas 
Laycock's version of substantive neutrality comes into play, minus 
any claim to neutrality.333 His approach gels aspects of liberty, 
equality, separation, and accommodation, because each of these 
principles has a role to play in minimizing government 
encouragement or discouragement of religion. 334 Yet in a massive 
regulatory state how one minimizes government encouragement of 
religion without discouraging religion is a complex problem.335 The 
facilitation test is an attempt to avoid government encouragement 
of religion without unduly discouraging religion. 
The test is essentially this: Government action that substantially 
facilitates or discourages religion violates the Establishment Clause. 
The definition of "government action" and substantial facilitation or 
discouragement of religion are essential to understanding this test. 
Before addressing these two issues, it is useful to note that the test 
is very much focused on the effects of government action and, as will 
be seen, purpose is only relevant when there is relatively clear 
evidence of an intent to favor or discriminate against religion. 
Focusing on effects is certainly not a new idea.336 The "effects" 
332 See infra notes 385-463 and accompanying text. 
333 See supra notes 81-126 and accompanying text. 
334 Laycock, supra note 3, at 1001-06. 
335 Cf. id. at 1018. 
336 Effects were a central element of the Lemon test. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 
612 (1971). Of course, as was explained earlier, the Court seems to have moved away from 
any serious "effects" test, at least in the aid context. See supra notes 52-247 and 
accompanying text. See also Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First 
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prong of the Lemon test is a good example,337 and the endorsement 
test also focuses on effects, at least in theory.33s Additionally, a 
number of scholars have proposed effects oriented tests, often based 
on the Lemon "effects" prong. 
For purposes of this test, "government action" consists of any 
program, activity, or decision supported by government entities or 
officials in their official capacity. Whether the actions or decisions 
of private individuals can cut offthe government's role in facilitating 
religion depends on the nature of the government action and the role 
of the private individual or individuals. This is a clear rejection of 
the formalistic "true private choice" doctrine espoused in Zelman 
and Mitchell,339 but it allows for private choice to playa role in the 
analysis. This will be demonstrated below when the test is applied 
to a variety of situations. 
Defining substantial facilitation or discouragement of religion is 
both hard and easy. Facilitation is not the same thing as support. 
One can provide attenuated support for something without 
facilitating it.340 Facilitation is about furthering the religious 
activities of a program or entity, or about furthering religious 
practice or the stature of a given religion or of religion generally.341 
Thus, facilitation does not rely on bright-line distinctions such as 
direct or indirect aid, because it is the effect of the aid that 
determines whether it facilitates religion under the test. While it 
is more likely that direct aid to a religious organization will 
Amendment: The History, The Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222, 263-64 
(arguing that Zelman Court essentially gutted "effects" test in aid context and that current 
doctrine will uphold programs that have effect of providing substantial benefits to 
mainstream religions but will not likely have similar effect for programs that benefit religious 
minorities). 
337 The outcome in Lemon itself was determined by the entanglement element of the test, 
and thus the Court did not reach the "effects" element. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-14. 
338 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
(discussing relationship between endorsement test and "effects" prong of Lemon). 
339 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,649 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 
810 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
340 "Facilitate" is defined as "to make easier; help bring about," MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY (New ed. 1994), and "to ease a process." THE OXFORD DESK DICTIONARY 202 
(American ed. 1995). 
341 This latter point will be further defmed when the test is applied to government 
displays of religious symbols. See infra notes 440-54 and accompanying text. 
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facilitate religion than indirect aid (although indirect aid can 
facilitate religion as well), it is not automatically so. 
Discouragement of religion is highly relevant in the Free Exercise 
Clause context, but for present purposes, the key is that 
discouragement relates more to religious adherents than to religious 
organizations. Thus, for example, government cannot facilitate the 
religious work of religious organizations, nor can it prevent 
individuals from using public funds at religious institutions under 
truly broad and open government programs.342 These two concepts 
would dramatically conflict with each other were it not for the 
substantiality requirement. 
Substantial facilitation is more than simply giving some minor 
support to a religious institution-it is not a strict separationist 
concept. It is a balancing approach that looks to the real-world 
impact of government action. Significantly, substantiality is tied to 
the government action-i.e., whether a substantial effect of the 
action is to facilitate religion. Thus, in some contexts, such as 
government-sponsored prayer, it is always violated, while in the 
context of government aid programs the total amount of aid going 
to religious entities matters, as does the proportion of program 
funds that go to religious entities. There is a vast difference 
between Zobrest and Zelman under the facilitation test.343 As will 
be seen, the result in Zobrest would have been the same under the 
facilitation test, while the result in Zelman would have been 
different.3« 
The facilitation test will not provide bright-line answers in some 
contexts, but it might in others. Bright-line answers, however, are 
not the primary goal of the facilitation test. Rather, reasonable 
consistency is the most that can be expected. Reasonable 
consistency is possible under the test even in aid cases where 
342 As will be seen, this suggests that Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 
(1993), and Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), were correctly 
decided. 
343 Compare infra notes 406-25 and accompanying text (arguing that Cleveland voucher 
program is unconstitutional under facilitation test), with infra notes 427-39 and 
accompanying text (suggesting that broad programs of government aid that do not give 
disproportionate benefits to religious entities as compared to other private entities are 
constitutional). 
S4f [d. 
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context has the largest impact on its application. The goal is to 
provide reasonable consistency while remaining sensitive to the 
variety of principles that are at play in religion clause cases. To 
gain a better understanding of how the facilitation test functions, it 
will be applied to a school prayer situation,346 a school voucher 
program,346 a program of general educational aid,347 the display of 
holiday symbols by government,348 and an equal access case.349 
Finally, how the test might be used under the Free Exercise Clause 
will be addressed.360 
It is essential to point out here that this is the first attempt to 
frame the test. Thus, this Article provides a sketch of the test at 
best. While the test is not perfect, it has the potential to be useful 
as an alternative to the current formalistic approach without 
sacrificing a reasonable level of consistency. The test attempts to 
effectuate various principles, especially separationism and 
accommodationism, and through its application the false antinomy 
between these principles will hopefully be reduced. The next 
subsection attempts to answer the question: "Why base the test on 
facilitation?" This will be followed by subsections applying the test 
to a variety of situations that have arisen under the Establishment 
Clause. 
A. WHY FACILITATION? 
Given the many possible tests that could be based on the various 
narrow principles that undergird the Establishment Clause, why 
should facilitation be the preferred test? There are several reasons 
for focusing on facilitation. First, facilitation resonates better with 
both separation and accommodation when they are construed as 
narrow principles. Moreover, it resonates with broad notions of 
liberty and equality, even considering the malleability of those 
concepts. Second, as will be seen, facilitation works well across the 
345 See infra notes 385-405 and accompanying text. 
346 See infra notes 406-25 and accompanying text. 
347 See infra notes 427-39 and accompanying text. 
346 See infra notes 440-54 and accompanying text. 
349 See infra notes 455-59 and accompanying text. 
350 See infra notes 460-63 and accompanying text. 
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varied issues that arise under the Establishment Clause.351 Third, 
the facilitation test is designed to minimize the real-world 
encouragement or discouragement of religion by government, and 
thus embodies Professor Laycock's substantive principle (minus its 
claim of neutrality) which this Article has suggested is quite 
valuable in analyzing Establishment Clause claims.352 Finally, the 
facilitation test melds aspects of a variety of tests the Court has 
used in the past, and thus is not a completely new test. Its reliance 
on a variety of narrowly construed principles is new,353 as is an 
attempt to avoid the tension between principles and tests that has 
been inherent in much of the Court's doctrine; but the test is not 
alien to that doctrine, even if it is not perfectly consistent with it.354 
Any test that arises in the Establishment Clause context must 
function in a space where thousands of religious traditions thrive 
among hundreds of millions of people in a complex regulatory state. 
It must grapple with the constitutional command that religion, like 
speech, is special,355 and it must do so in the context of a diverse 
array of issues. 356 The current Court seems to believe that the way 
to approach religion in the constitutional realm is to treat it the 
same as everything else in some contexts, yet recognize that it is 
different in other contexts. 357 While there are some plausible 
351 See infra notes 385-459 and accompanying text. 
352 See supra notes 52-247 and accompanying text. 
353 The concept of relying on multiple and varied approaches to constitutional 
interpretation, however, is not new. Philip Bobbitt's modalities of Constitutional 
Interpretation are an example of an approach that relies on a variety of factors whose 
importance vary given the interpretive situation. PIDLIP BOBBITI', CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 11-22 (1991). Admittedly, Bobbitt's modalities operate more as interpretive 
devices than the narrow principles suggested herein, which must be actuated through the 
interpretive process. 1d. at 22 ("The modalities of constitutional argument are the ways in 
which law statements in constitutional matters are assessed; standing alone they assert 
nothing about the world. But they need only stand alone to provide the means for making 
constitutional argument."). 
354 This should come as no surprise given that the Court's doctrine has not been consistent 
over the years. See supra notes 1-247 and accompanying text. 
356 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
356 A number of these issues are discussed infra notes 385-463 and accompanying text. 
357 Perhaps the best example of this is the Rehnquist Court's treatment of fmancial aid 
that flows to religious entities and Free Exercise Clause exemptions on the one hand, and 
school prayer on the other hand. Compare Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 
(2002) (using formal neutrality to uphold school vouchers), Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 
794-95 (2000) (plurality opinion) (using formal neutrality to uphold lending of equipment to 
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distinctions between the contexts in which the Court has treated 
religion like other considerations and where it treats religion 
differently, the likely reason for the dichotomy is the vastly different 
alignment of Justices in the various cases. With the exception of 
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, for example, no Justice in the 
majority in Zelman was also in the majority in Santa Fe v. Doe. 
From the time of Everson until recently, the Court seemed to 
understand that religion is different.3ss The early cases, animated 
as they were by notions of separation, clearly did not see religion the 
same as other considerations.3s9 Yet even in those cases, it was 
understood that religion could not be discouraged or discriminated 
against by government.3GO Ironically, the distinction seemed to be 
religious schools), and Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (using formal 
neutrality type argument to hold that there is no constitutional right to exemption from 
generally applicable law that burdens one's religious practice), with Santa Fe Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (holding prayer at public school football games delivered 
by student pursuant to school policy that allowed students to elect speaker is 
unconstitutional). 
3S8 Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992) 
(The First Amendment protects speech and religion by quite different 
mechanisms. Speech is protected by ensuring its full expression even 
when the government participates .... The method for protecting freedom 
of worship and freedom of conscience in religious matters is quite the 
reverse. In religious debate or expression the government is not a prime 
participant, for the Framers deemed religious establishment antithetical 
to the freedom of all.), 
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) ("[Tlhe First Amendment rests upon the 
premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each 
is left free from the other within its respective sphere. "), and Everson v. Bd. ofEduc., 330 U.S. 
1, 18 (1947) ("The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall 
must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach."), with 
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 670 (holding that facially neutral school voucher program is 
constitutional where 96.6.% of voucher students attend religious schools because a few secular 
private schools and sizeable number of public magnet and charter schools are available, thus 
giving parents "true private choice" in deciding that their children will attend religious 
schools). 
359 See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 ("The First Amendment has erected a wall between 
church and state."); McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212 ("[Tlhe First Amendment rests upon the 
premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each 
is left free from the other within its respective sphere. "). 
1d. 
300 See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-18. 
[W]e must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against 
state-established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently 
prohibit New Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its 
citizens without regard to their religious belief ... State power is no more 
to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them. 
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based on the real-world functioning and effects of a program in the 
aid context, a distinction that was later reflected in Zobrest and 
Witters. 
The facilitation test attempts to maintain fidelity to this 
distinction, and its focus is on the real-world impact of the 
government action or program in question-a necessary focus given 
the massive web of government programs in the modern regulatory 
state. It also tries to maintain consistency across issues so that the 
same test, relying on the same narrowly construed principles, can 
function in the aid context, the equal access context, the school 
prayer context, the religious symbolism context, and so on. 
Inconsistency in the treatment of claims between (and within) these 
various contexts has been a hallmark of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, because none of the tests works well in this diverse 
array of contexts without betraying the (often broad) principles said 
to undergird them. The facilitation test, however, can be applied 
across these contexts without betraying the narrow principles that 
undergird it. This can only be done by recognizing that religion is 
indeed constitutionally special or different; therefore, religious 
entities and exercises should only be treated the same as others 
when treating them differently would discourage religion and where 
treating them the same would not cause government to 
substantially facilitate religion. The context and real-world impact 
of government action is of central importance in striking this 
balance. As a corollary, formalism is not the friend of consistency, 
and indeed, consistency across the many issues that arise can only 
be achieved by carefully analyzing government actions in their 
context and by maintaining a connection to the narrowly construed 
principles that govern Establishment Clause analysis under the 
facilitation test. 
I make no suggestion that the facilitation test is determinate in 
the sense that notions offormal neutrality or strict separation claim 
determinacy. Indeed, no universal principal of facilitation can be 
automatically applied to varied factual contexts to yield consistent 
results. Context matters. Yet underlying the test is a narrow view 
of separation, which requires that government not facilitate the 
religious mission of religious institutions or enhance the stature of 
religion vis a vis irreligion or of specific religions. Also underlying 
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the text is a narrow view of accommodation, which requires that 
government not discourage religion, that it allow religious 
organizations and views equal access to public forums, and that it 
not exclude religious entities from broad funding programs that 
would not substantially facilitate religion. An inherent tension 
between separation and accommodation exists, even when they 
operate as narrow principles. The facilitation test is an attempt to 
balance the competing aspects of these principles. 
In attempting to balance separation and accommodation, the 
facilitation test attempts to maintain equality as a narrow concept, 
but not by always treating religion like other phenomena. Rather, 
the test requires religion be treated the same where doing so does 
not substantially facilitate religion. The latter qualification 
recognizes that religion need not always be treated the same, and in 
fact, that sometimes treating religion the same as nonreligion will 
give dominant religions an advantage over less dominant religions 
and would therefore foster "inequality." Thus, facial even-
handedness is not the animating force behind this narrow view of 
equality. Equality in this context can only be judged by looking at 
the effects of a government policy or action and determining 
whether religion, a religious entity (or irreligion or an antireligious 
entity), or a specific religion is receiving a symbolic benefit not 
received by others or a material benefit not practically available to 
others. Even then, it is not claimed that this is equality in any 
universally recognized sense, and it must be considered in light of 
the narrow versions of separationism and accommodationism. No 
approach to Establishment Clause cases would result in absolute 
and universal equality given the vast number of religions and 
potential government interactions with religion in the United 
States, but the facilitation test attempts to make sure government 
actions do not make some religions "more equal" than others, or 
religion "more equal" than irreligion-and vice versa. 
Additionally, the test attempts to protect religious liberty to the 
greatest extent possible, given the amorphous nature of that 
concept. It does so by attempting to minimize government 
interference in religious affairs and institutions. This is, of course, 
consistent with Douglas Laycock's notion of substantive 
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neutrality.361 Thus, the facilitation test views religious liberty in the 
narrow sense of noninterference. It is, though, cognizant ofthe fact 
that in a massive regulatory state noninterference by itself may not 
always promote what many people think of as religious liberty; such 
a formulation is one of many said to further religious liberty, and 
like all the others, is contestable. 
In attempting to minimize government encouragement or 
discouragement of religion, the facilitation test recognizes that as a 
practical matter any choice will, to some extent, encourage or 
discourage religion. Nevertheless, as Laycock has argued, the goal 
must be to minimize the encouragement and discouragement of 
religion, not to make it non.existent.362 The substantiality 
requirement in the facilitation test is meant to help provide balance 
here. If the government action in question substantially facilitates 
the religious mission or status of a religion, religious individual, or 
religious organization, it encourages religion and conflicts with the 
separation principle. Moreover, allowing such substantial 
facilitation can not be said to simply accommodate religion because 
religion would be receiving an important material or symbolic 
benefit from government. Conversely, if the facilitation is not 
substantial, religion is probably not being encouraged. Thus 
allowing the government action is less likely to conflict with the 
separation principle. Failing to provide the benefit to religion in 
these contexts might discourage religion and thus allowing the 
benefit would be consistent with the accommodation principle. 
The facilitation test is somewhat (although not completely) 
consistent with Court doctrine, both past and present. Its focus 
upon real-world effects has much in common with the "effects" prong 
of the Lemon test. Yet the substantiality requirement would likely 
have allowed the programs at issue in Meek v. Pittenger, 363 Wolman 
v. Walter,364 and Aguilar v. FeltonS65 to survive, while the programs 
361 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 1001-06. 
362 [d. at 1004 ("Absolute zero is no more attainable in encouragement and discouragement 
than in temperature. We can aspire only to minimize encouragement and discouragement."). 
363 421 U.S. 329 (1975). 
364 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
365 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
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upheld in Mueller v. Allen366 and perhaps Bowen v. Kendrick367 
would have most likely been struck down. The application of the 
facilitation test in the aid context is discussed further below. 368 
As will be seen, it is a given that government sponsored or 
endorsed prayer substantially facilitates religion,369 but the display 
of religious symbols is very much connected to the question of 
whether a given display is a private display in a public forum or 
something else.370 As will be seen, Marsh, Lynch, and Allegheny 
would have come out differently urider the facilitation test, but 
every other symbolism, school prayer, and equal access case would 
most likely have come out the same way, albeit for reasons different 
than the COurt'S.371 Yet the facilitation test retains aspects of the 
endorsement test. For example, while the facilitation test generally 
rejects looking at legislative purposes, given the problems with 
determining the purpose of a broad group of individuals acting as a 
legislative body, it does allow a "purpose" analysis in situations 
where a government actor, including a legislature, demonstrates a 
purpose to endorse religion as defined by Justice O'Connor.372 An 
example of such a situation is provided by the recent and troubling 
behavior of the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, Roy 
Moore.373 Moreover, while the facilitation test is not directly 
386 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
367 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
368 See infra notes 406-39 and accompanying text. 
369 See infra notes 385-405 and accompanying text. 
370 See infra notes 440-59 and accompanying text. 
371 See infra notes 395-98, 443-54 and accompanying text. 
372 Justice O'Connor defmed endorsement as follows: 
In my concurrence in Lynch, I suggested a clarification of our 
Establishment Clause doctrine to reinforce the concept that the 
Establishment Clause "prohibits government from making adherence to 
a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political 
community." The government violates this prohibition if it endorses or 
disapproves of religion. "Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents 
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and 
an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community." Disapproval of religion conveys the 
opposite message. 
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (quoting 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984». 
373 Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284-86 (11th Cir. 2003). Chief Justice Moore 
installed a massive stone tablet of the Ten Commandments in a central location in the 
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concerned with the effect of government actors on reasonable 
observers, a government action that substantially facilitates religion 
is likely to result in a perception of endorsement by a reasonable 
observer-although whether it does or not, the conclusion remains 
that such an action would be unconstitutional.374 
Additionally, an act that coerces participation in a religious event 
or program would ordinarily be one that substantially facilitates 
religion,375 but the facilitation test is concerned with far more than 
coercion.376 Of the Court's three major tests, the facilitation test 
probably has the least in common with the coercion test, but as a 
practical matter, the results in cases involving religious exercises 
(where that test has been most clearly used by the Court) would 
likely be the same.377 What coerces an individual to participate or 
remain silent while the government endorses or engages in a 
religious ceremony will substantially facilitate religion, but coercion 
is not necessary for the facilitation test to be violated.378 
Finally, the facilitation test does not rely on a hard originalist 
approach.379 Unlike the Court's early separationist approach and 
the approach of the Justices who opposed the Court's reading of 
history,380 the facilitation test acknowledges that both sides of the 
courthouse in the middle of the night without informing the other justices and with a film 
crew from Coral Ridge Ministries present to f11m the event. Id. 
374 See infra notes 440-54 and accompanying text (discussing facilitation test as applied 
to government display of religious symbols). 
375 It is the state sponsorship or endorsement of a religious activity that facilitates 
religion, and coercion is simply a byproduct of something that would be unconstitutional 
under the facilitation test even if there were no coercion. See infra notes 385-405 and 
accompanying text (applying facilitation test to school prayer cases). However, in its coercion 
analysis, the Lee Court repeatedly engaged in analysis that would support a similar result 
under the facilitation test. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) ("The prayer 
exercises in this case are especially improper because the State has in every practical sense 
compelled attendance and participation in an explicit religious exercise at an event of singular 
importance to every student, one the objecting student had no real alternative to avoid. "). 
376 See supra notes 335-44 and accompanying text. 
377 See infra notes 385-405 and accompanying text. 
378 Id. 
378 See Sunstein, supra note 271, at 312 (explaining why hardoriginalism is unacceptable). 
380 Compare McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 213-21 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (using historical arguments to support separationism), Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 
330 U.S. I, 8-16 (1947) (same), and id. at 31-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (same), with 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (using historical 
argument to rebut historical support for separationism), and McCollum, 333 U.S. at 244-52 
(Reed, J., dissenting) (same). 
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debate can support their preferred approach with snippets of 
history.381 In essence, history and the views of the Framers can be 
manipulated to support either side because of the large number of 
actors involved in drafting and ratifying the First Amendment (and 
the Fourteenth for that matter), and the massive differences in both 
religious pluralism and the nature of government then and now. 382 
At best, in this context we might glean some consistency from the 
broad intentions of those involved in drafting and ratifying the 
Constitution-what has been called a "soft originalist" approach.3ss 
The historical debate in this area is both fascinating and 
enlightening, but no legal test can faithfully rely on history given 
the types of issues that arise today and the dramatic increase in 
religious diversity and the role of government, even if one were able 
to determine whether we should rely on the broad intent or narrow 
practices of the Framers (which would often conflict in modern 
times).384 
Perhaps the best way to understand the above discussion is to see 
the facilitation test applied to some of the common situations that 
381 The opinions on both sides marshal a great deal of historical support, but neither 
adequately rebuts the other's historical proof. See supra note 380. 
382 Rena M. Bila, Note, The Establishment Clause: A Constitutional Permission Slip for 
Religion in Public Education, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 1535, 1545 (1995); Laycock, supra note 269, 
at 919-20. 
383 See Sunstein, supra note 271, at 313 (explaining that, for soft originalist, history is 
important, but at "certain level of abstraction or generality"); cf John Witte, Jr., The 
Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional Experiment, 71 
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 371, 375, 431-32 (1996) (deriving group of "first principles" from detailed 
and careful analysis of history of religious freedom in United States, but acknowledging that 
these principles were subject to different interpretations and cannot be applied as rigid legal 
doctrine). 
[d. 
384 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,237-41 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
A too literal quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers upon the 
issues in these cases seems to me futile and misdirected for several 
reasons: First, on our precise problem the historical record is at best 
ambiguous, and statements can readily be found to support either side of 
the proposition .... 
Second, the structure of American education has greatly changed since 
the First Amendment was adopted .... 
Third, our religious composition makes us a vastly more diverse people 
than were our forefathers .... 
Whatever Jefferson or Madison would have thought of Bible reading or 
the recital of the Lord's Prayer in what few public schools existed in their 
day, our use of the history of their time must limit itself to broad 
purposes, not specific practices. 
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arise under the Establishment Clause. The following subsections 
will apply the facilitation test to such situations. Ai; with any test 
in this area of constitutional law there may be a tendency for those 
predisposed toward the results reached by the test to like it and 
those not so predisposed to reject it. Of course, this may not bode 
well for the facilitation test as folks on all sides of the 
Establishment Clause debate will like some of the results reached 
and dislike others. I see this as a strength of the test, because by 
considering context and rejecting either formalistic extreme (formal 
neutrality and strict separation), the test is able to reach results 
that resonate better with the narrow principles undergirding it and 
many of the Court's holdings (although certainly not all of them). 
B. SCHOOL PRAYER CASES 
School prayer is perhaps the easiest scenario for the facilitation 
test. When government sponsors school prayer or other 
quintessentially religious exercises such as Bible reading, whether 
non-sectarian or not, it substantially facilitates religion.385 The 
question gets trickier when someone claims that the prayer is not 
government-sponsored.386 If the prayer occurs at a government-
sponsored event, it generally violates the test because the 
government controls the forum and thus facilitates the prayer,387 but 
what if the government-sponsored forum is a public forum? In this 
limited case, government is not substantially facilitating religion. 
Contrary to the odd ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit in Chandler v. Siegelman,388 events such as 
graduation ceremonies are not public fora unless the government 
opens them up to counter-speech.389 Even in a limited or designated 
386 In this situation, the test leads to results similar to those in Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), Schempp, 374 U.S. at 203, 
and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), but as will be seen, under somewhat different 
reasoning. 
386 This was exactly the claim made by the school district in Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302. 
387 Id. at 302-06. 
388 230 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 916 (2001) (stating that 
student-initiated prayer aloud or in front of audience gathered for some other purpose is not 
prohibited by Constitution). 
389 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301-03. 
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public forum, the forum would have to be open to other speech by 
those appropriately using the forum. 390 
Thus, the results in Engel v. Vitale,S91 School District of Abington 
Township v. Schempp,392 Lee v. Weisman,393 and Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe,394 were all correct under the 
facilitation test. On the other hand, Marsh v. Chambers,395 which 
dealt with legislative prayer, was wrongly decided. Maintaining the 
chaplaincy and having the daily prayers in the Nebraska legislature 
substantially facilitated religion, both because the most substantial 
aspect of the prayer was religious,396 and because a formal daily 
prayer substantially singles out religion for special ceremonial 
recognition.397 Moreover, under the facts in Marsh, the special 
recognition went primarily to a single religion.398 
Interestingly, Wallace v. Jaf{ree399 is a questionable decision 
under the facilitation test. The legislative purpose to favor religion 
would violate the test if that purpose were clear, but given the large 
number of legislators involved in passing a state statute, such 
clarity can be hard to come by.400 The evidence relied upon by the 
Court, including statements by the bill's sponsor, might not reflect 
the overall legislative purpose (assuming that such a purpose could 
be determined), and the facilitation test might not be violated.401 
Under that test, a moment of silence that allows for silent 
meditation, prayer or any other silent reflection a student may wish 
to engage in is not facially invalid.402 In this context, prayer may be 
a small portion of the effect of such a moment of silence, and to the 
extent the moment of silence does allow prayer, the prayer remains 
390 [d. at 302-04 (noting that access to the forum cannot be selective). 
391 370 U.S. 421, 424, 430-31 (1962). 
392 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963). 
393 505 U.S. 577, 598-99 (1992). 
394 530 U.S. 290, 316-17 (2000). 
395 463 U.S. 783, 791 (1983). 
396 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
397 [d. at 798 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
398 [d. at 822-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
399 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
- [d. at 86-87 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
401 [d. 
402 Contra id. at 59-61 (noting that such policy is facially invalid iflegislature did not have 
valid secular purpose in enacting law). 
HeinOnline -- 38 Ga. L. Rev. 560 2003-2004
560 GEORGIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 38:489 
personal to the student who chooses to silently pray.403 If a statute 
were written in such a way that prayer was the primary option, or 
if prayer were encouraged under the statute as may have been the 
case in Wallace, the statute would be unconstitutional for the same 
reasons as in Marsh. 404 More importantly, if a moment of silence 
law were applied in a manner that encouraged prayer, it would be 
unconstitutional as applied. 405 
C. SCHOOL VOUCHERS 
The Cleveland program upheld in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris406 
would violate the facilitation test. Yet not all voucher programs 
would automatically violate the test. There is little doubt that the 
Cleveland voucher program substantially facilitated religion even if 
one uses the comparison group the Court used in its analysis. As 
explained above, the Court's choice of comparison schools is highly 
questionable.407 The facilitation test is clearly and significantly 
violated if we remove the public school programs the Court relied 
upon to dilute the choice statistics. 
Assuming that the Court was correct to include magnet schools, 
community schools, and tutoring stipends for public school students 
in the comparison group with private schools,408 the voucher 
program still substantially facilitates religious entities. The fact 
that 3,637 students were given tuition vouchers to attend religious 
schools,409 and that those vouchers were more than enough to cover 
full tuition for many of the students,410 would have a substantial 
impact on enrollment at religious schools. Those schools are 
benefitting from thousands of students they would otherwise not 
get. As a result, the sponsoring religious institutions will have 
substantially increased their ability to meet budgetary needs and 
403 [d. at 85-86,89-90 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
404 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791 (holding prayer in state legislature constitutional). 
406 See Walterv. W. Va. Bd. of Educ., 610 F. Supp. 1169,1177 (D. W. Va. 1985) (rmding 
application of moment of silence law unconstitutional). 
408 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
407 See supra notes 81-126 and accompanying text. 
408 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645-48, 658-59; id. at 663-64, 672-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
409 [d. at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
410 Id. at 704-06 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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further their religious missions. Thousands of students will worship 
and receive religious training at taxpayer expense. m Perhaps more 
significantly, since nearly two thirds of those "choosing" to go to 
religious schools had inadequate religious school options within 
their own faiths, over two thousand students are attending schools 
outside of their own faiths.412 This gives those religious sects that 
believe in proselytization a captive audience, and even if students 
are excused from religious worship and religious training, they are 
still a captive audience in a potentially religiously infused 
environment with peers and teachers who may overwhelmingly 
believe in the sponsoring religion.413 
While the largest group of religious schools in Cleveland are 
Catholic schools, which have a solid track record of tolerance toward 
those of other faiths in many areas,414 the reasoning in Zelman is 
not limited to Cleveland. For those who live in areas of the country 
where the dominant religious schools are Evangelical, the likelihood 
that students will be regularly witnessed to by peers and others 
even if they are excused from religion classes is higher. Even in a 
religious school environment where there is extreme sensitivity to 
nonbelievers, the impact of spending one's elementary and 
secondary school years in an environment dominated by a religious 
faith different from one's own is bound to cause many voucher 
students to be more open to the school's faith. All of this on the 
government's dollar. 
The above scenarios-increased student bodies with full tuition 
paid at government expense and impressionable students who may 
face serious challenges to their core beliefs or be influenced to adopt 
the core beliefs of the religious schools they attend-are indications 
of substantial facilitation of religion. The percentage of students in 
the Cleveland schools is irrelevant from this perspective. One could 
expand the comparison group to include the entire Cleveland school 
system. Still, more than 3,637 students are given up to $2,250 each 
411 [d. at 686-87 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
412 [d. at 704 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
413 Cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598-99 (1992) (applying captive audience concept to 
graduation ceremony). 
414 See O'Keefe, supra note 168, at 425-27 (noting important contributions of Catholic 
schools, including production of well-informed students). 
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at religious schools,4l5 for a total of approximately $8,200,000.00 in 
the 1999~2000 school year based on use of the full $2,250 by all 
students,4l6 or a total of$5, 790,104.00 if one uses the lower Catholic 
school tuition rate. This is enough to substantially facilitate 
religion. 
When one excludes the public school options that the Court 
included in the comparison group, the facilitation is even more 
obvious-3,637 out of 3,765 students417 (96.6%) receiving private 
school vouchers·used them at religious schools.4lS Moreover, there 
were almost five times as many religious private schools as secular 
private schools participating in the program,419 and on average, the 
secular schools had fewer seats per school than the religious 
schools.420 This is in addition to the millions of public dollars 
flowing to religious entities and the possibility of indoctrination 
mentioned above. Yet under the facilitation test voucher programs 
are not inherently unconstitutional just because a substantial 
amount of money may flow to religious entities and indoctrination 
may occur. 
Ironically, since the facilitation test is not a rigid formalistic test, 
if there were a program of "real private choice," the program would 
be constitutional even if money flowed to religion through such a 
program. The reason for this is similar to the Court's reasoning in 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,421 because in a 
situation where government gives money to a large number of 
individuals to spend as they choose ·on a particular service, and 
there really are a wide array of comparable choices, both religious 
and non~religious, it is no longer government that facilitates 
religion.422 Moreover, the amount and percentage of funds in such 
programs that flow to religious schools is likely to be relatively 
416 Or $1,592-the average Catholic School tuition. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 704-06 (Souter, 
J., dissenting). 
418 [d. at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 700-01 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
417 [d. at 664 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
418 [d. at 703 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
419 [d. at 646. 
420 [d. at 704-05 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
421 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
422 [d. at 10. 
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small. 423 Yet if a large amount of funds in a given program did flow 
to religious institutions, the program might be subject to an "as 
applied" challenge under the facilitation test because the test 
focuses on the effects of government action. 
Of course, the Court used each of these points (except the last 
one) to support its ruling in Zelman.424 The difference under the 
facilitation test is how seriously one looks at the effects of the 
government program and what counts as an effect that facilitates 
religion as compared to the Court's formalistic neutrality-plus-
private-choice approach. Under the facilitation test, the neutrality 
of a program on its face is only relevant to the extent that a program 
openly discriminates between religions or between religion and 
nonreligion. The individual choice, or "circuit breaker," concept is 
essentially a defense to claims that the effects of a government 
action substantially facilitate religion. Still, a program that 
provides "true individual choice"-somethingthis Article has argued 
did not exist in Zelman425-is not completely immune from 
constitutional scrutiny. Moreover, whether a program provides such 
choice is dependant on the way that program actually functions and 
the effects it has. As noted above, the Cleveland voucher program 
in Zelman did not provide such choice, and even if we use the 
Court's expanded comparison group426 the effects of the program 
substantially facilitate religion. Let us turn now to a situation 
where the private choice factor comes into play under the facilitation 
test in order to see how the test works when there is indeed a broad 
program that supports private choice. 
D. GENERAL EDUCATIONAL AID PROGRAMS 
For purposes of this Article, "general educational aid programs" 
are programs that provide money to individuals to be used at an 
educational institution for a specified service or services. Cases like 
423 Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485-86, 488 (1986). 
424 See generally Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639. 
425 See supra notes 81-126 and accompanying text (discussing importance of individual 
"choice" in neutrality test). 
428 Thus expanding the choice between private schools and certain types of publicly 
supported schools but still not expanding the choice within the private school subset. 
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Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District4.27 and Witters v. 
Washington Department of Services for the Blind428 provide excellent 
examples of such programs, both of which involved funding for 
disability-related services. Other examples would be the G.I. Bill 
and Pell grants. These programs give a specified amount offunding 
to an individual based on legislatively or administratively 
determined factors. The funding is to be used for a given purpose at 
a qualifying educational institution.429 Therefore, a variety of 
secular and religious institutions qualify,430 and there is generally 
breadth in the level of religiosity and religious affiliation of such 
institutions.431 
Such programs do not substantially facilitate religious 
institutions as compared to non-religious institutions, because there 
are generally a large number of qualifying institutions and a wide 
range of program beneficiaries from across a given state or the 
entire nation. To the extent that they funnel money to religious 
institutions, these programs generally fund only a particular 
service, such as a sign language interpreter or other 
accommodation,432 or tuition for only a small proportion of students 
attending a given institution.433 Thus, these programs do not 
provide the disproportionate and possibly substantial benefit to 
religious institutions that the Cleveland voucher program did in 
Zelman.434 Still, by enabling students to attend religious 
institutions that they otherwise might not be able to attend, these 
programs might allow a substantial amount of money to flow to 
religious institutions over time. This is where the private choice 
defense comes into play. 
427 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
428 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
429 See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3-4 (noting that purpose was to accommodate petitioner's 
disability pursuant to IDEA). See generally Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 
U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000). 
430 Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10; Witters, 474 U.S. at 487. 
~l Cf Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10 (noting that benefits are distributed under IDEA "without 
regard to the 'sectarian-non-sectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child 
attends"). 
(32 Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3, 13. 
~3 Witters, 474 U.S. at 488. 
434 See supra notes 81-126, 406-25 and accompanying text. 
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As was explained in the last section, if there really is a wide 
range of compatible alternatives for program participants to choose 
from under a government program, the government is no longer 
facilitating religion unless the program consistently and 
disproportionately funds religious institutions as applied. Thus, the 
private choice of the individual recipient really does act like a circuit 
breaker, but the defense only comes into play where a program that 
does not disproportionately support religion provides substantial 
funding to a religious institution or institutions. Where a program 
does not disproportionately support religion and substantial funds 
do not go to religious institutions, the facilitation test is not violated. 
When the former is true, but not the latter, the private choice 
defense can come into play to demonstrate that the government is 
not substantially facilitating religion: rather, individuals choose 
from a wide array of options to go to a religious institution. 435 
Two significant definitional problems arise here. First, what 
constitutes "disproportionate support of religion," and second, what 
would constitute a "substantial sum" of money? Both of these 
questions would be answered on a case-by-case basis based on the 
dynamics of the programs involved. Still, some guidance is in order. 
The most obvious examples of disproportionate funding would be 
where most of the funding in a given program went to religious 
institutions, or where one particular religious organization or a 
variety of entities from a specific religion or sect get the bulk of the 
funding that goes to religious institutions. In the second situation, 
so long as the program does not disproportionately support religion 
over non-religion, the individual choice defense would be available. 
What constitutes a substantial sum of money depends on the 
breadth of the program and the benefit the money gives religious 
institutions. Thus, in a statewide or national program, 8.2 million 
435 This would be similar to the situations in Witters and Zobrest. See, e.g., Zobrest, 509 
U.S. at 10 (stating that benefits distributed under IDEA are constitutional because they are 
available "without regard to the 'sectarian-non-sectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of the 
school the child attends"). Of course, the wide scope of the programs in those cases made any 
funding that did flow to religious institutions more diffuse. Thus, the amount offunds that 
might flow to religious institutions would be less substantial than in a tuition voucher 
program like the one in Zelman. Even if the level of aid was more substantial, however, the 
wide range of both non-sectarian and sectarian options available in those programs would 
support the defense. 
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dollars split among hundreds or thousands of participating religious 
entities would not be a substantial sum, but that same amount 
would be substantial when applied to fewer than fifty private 
schools in one city. The benefits allegedly garnered by the high 
school in Zobrest and the university in Witters were not substantial 
even if one considers the other students who used the funds at 
religious schools under the relevant programs.436 
Another aspect is tied to the substantiality of the funding for the 
religious institutions themselves. There is a huge difference in 
substantiality between a program which may enable a few disabled 
individuals to attend a religiously affiliated university or a religious 
high school (not even on a full tuition subsidy)437 and a program that 
pays full tuition for many students at a given religious school or 
schools.438 The latter program substantially facilitates the religious 
institution in its mission, but the former simply provides an 
incidental benefit to the religious institution in a context where 
program beneficiaries have a wide range of choices. To use Douglas 
Laycock's terminology, the former program does not significantly 
encourage or discourage religion, but the latter encourages 
religion.439 
E. GOVERNMENT DISPLAY OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS 
Justices have used a variety of tests to evaluate government 
displays of religious symbols, including the Lemon test (perhaps now 
the Lemon/Agostini test), the Endorsement test, and an apparent 
version of the "tradition" test.440 This has led to some highly 
438 Unlike the program in Zelman, the programs involved in Zobrest and Witters were 
large programs with a wide geographic scope that included numerous schools, both sectarian 
and nonsectarian. See generally Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 1; Witters, 474 U.S. at 481. 
437 See generally Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 1; Witters, 474 U.S. at 481. 
438 See generally Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639. 
439 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 1001-02. It is worth noting that, as a general matter, 
state programs that provide tuition support for college students would not violate the 
facilitation test because the range of choices available would include all public and private 
colleges within the state, thus enabling the private choice defense. Additionally, the amounts 
flowing to religious institutions under most such programs would be more akin to the 
situation in Witters and Zobrest than that in Zelman, although it might be greater than in the 
former cases. 
440 The various opinions in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) and County of 
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criticized decisions by the COurt.441 Under the facilitation test, any 
government display of a religious symbol that gives special attention 
or recognition to a religious holiday or religion substantially 
facilitates religion because, through such expression, government 
gives the specified religion or religion in general a special place in 
the public conscience. The effect of such a display inherently has a 
significant religious component.442 Of course, what counts as a 
religious symbol is highly relevant here, as is whether it gives 
special attention or recognition to a religious holiday or religion 
generally. 
The latter point is easier to address. The situation presented in 
Lynch v. Donnelly443 is an easy one to analyze under the facilitation 
test. The creche at issue in Lynch is inherently a religious symbol, 
and to a non-Christian as well as to devout Christians, a few plastic 
reindeer and other plastic figures-most of which reflect the 
Christmas holiday-cannot adequately (if at all) dilute the special 
recognition given to Christmas and the birth of Jesus which that 
holiday celebrates.444 Christmas, whether celebrated in its 
commercialized form or as the religious holiday it is, is simply not 
a holiday celebrated by many non-Christians. Thus, the government 
display of a creche during the Christmas season, regardless of the 
placement of that religious symbol, inherently gives special 
attention and recognition to the holiday and beliefs of a single 
religion, and in doing so, it substantially facilitates religion. 
The special attention or recognition requirement would not be 
met, however, by a religious painting in a museum because in such 
a setting the recognition given to religion is reduced by the context 
of the display. Religion is not substantially facilitated. Yet if the 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) demonstrate the variety of approaches Justices have 
used to analyze government displays of religious symbols. 
"1 The decisions in Allegheny and Lynch have been highly criticized. See, e.g., Daan 
Braveman, The Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality, 45 MD. L. REV. 
352,353-54 (1986) (criticizing Court's decision in Lynch); Michael W. McConnell, Religious 
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 115, 126-27 (1992) (criticizing decisions in both 
cases and suggesting that results of cases are "the worst of all possible outcomes"). 
442 See Braveman, supra note 441, at 368-69 (criticizing Lynch Court's plurality opinion 
rmding creche to be historical object). 
443 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
444 See Braveman, supra note 441, at 368-74 (criticizing Lynch opinion). 
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same painting were hung (not as part of a larger exhibit) in the 
main hall of the state capitol building the situation might be 
different. 445 
The symbol question determines how far this analysis would go. 
After all, a Christmas tree is also a symbol of Christmas. Yet a 
Christmas tree is not a cross, or for that matter, a creche. The 
facilitation test would consider anything that is associated with a 
specific religion or religions a religious symbol. Thus, a Christmas 
tree, which is associated only with the Christian holiday of 
Christmas, cannot be considered non-Christian just because that 
holiday has taken on a commercial aspect as well. The fact that 
"official announcements" of Congress have declared Christmas a 
national holiday446 would lend no extra support to a government 
entity that wants to put up the tree because Congress' 
announcements in this regard would themselves be unconstitutional 
under the facilitation test. What would be acceptable under that 
test, by contrast, would be Congress' closing of all nonessential 
government operations because of the likelihood and administrative 
reality that many people will likely take the day off. Finally, a 
Menorah is also a religious symbol for purposes of the facilitation 
test.447 
Does this mean that the President publicly lighting the White 
House Christmas tree violates the facilitation test? The short 
445 Questions about why that painting was chosen would also be relevant-thus 
reintroducing a limited purpose analysis (to determine if the decision was made to favor a 
particular faith or religion generally). For example, consider the difference between a mural 
of the Ten Commandments exhibited as part of a broader display of art in a public art 
museum and the actions of the former Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court. Justice 
Moore, who is known as the "Ten Commandments" judge, snuck a large stone engraving of 
the Ten Commandments into the Supreme Court building in the middle of the night without 
consulting his fellow justices. The large stone monument was displayed prominently in the 
courthouse, and the chief justice refused to allow other displays to receive similarly 
prominent attention. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Biblical Display in Court Rejected, Cm. TRlB., 
Nov. 19, 2002, at 10. The monument was removed pursuant to a federal court order, and 
Justice Moore was removed from office by Alabama's Court of the Judiciary. Ten 
Commandments Judge Removed From Office, CNN.COM, Nov. 14, 2003, at http://www.cnn. 
coml2003ILA W/111131moore. tencommandmentslindex.html. 
446 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676. 
447 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 633-34 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in judgment); id. at 643 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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answer is yes. According to the Court, a Christmas tree is not a 
symbol of a purely religious holiday but rather of a nationally-
recognized holiday with religious meaning (for some) and roots. 448 
These decisions have been soundly criticized both because of the 
Court's characterization of the holiday and because of its 
characterization of the symbols of that holiday.449 If a Christmas 
tree could function as a secular symbol, it is more likely that those 
who practice other faiths would be willing to have one. Yet if one is 
a devout Jew, Muslim, Hindu, or other non-Christian, one is 
unlikely to have a Christmas tree because Christmas is not a 
Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist holiday, nor is it considered a 
secular celebration by many Atheists. The irony that it is called a 
Christmas (or Christ's Mass) tree rather than a winter tree or 
holiday tree, seemed lost on the Court in Allegheny. 450 As for the 
Presidential lighting of the White House Christmas tree, it consists 
of the leader of the nation formally lighting a symbol that represents 
a major holiday of the dominant religion in the nation. This gives 
special attention or recognition to that holiday in a significant way. 
Imagine what would happen if a non-Christian President refused to 
have or light the White House Christmas tree. Of course, while the 
presidential lighting of the tree violates the facilitation test, it is a 
battle one might wisely abstain from engaging in.451 
The point here is that the government should not be in the 
business of posting religious symbols.'52 Doing so calls special 
attention to, or gives special recognition of, a religious holiday or a 
specific religion or religions. Unlike the endorsement test, however, 
the facilitation test rejects the notion that government posting of a 
4.a Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 616 . 
.. 9 See supra note 441 and accompanying text. 
450 Allegheny,492 U.S. at 581. 
451 It is important to note that a particular government action may violate the 
Establishment Clause, yet it may be unwise to challenge that action because it may do more 
damage than good to the cause of protecting against government establishments when the 
likely public response to the challenge is weighed against the benefits of bringing the claim. 
This may be particularly true in situations where the challenged practice is one of ceremonial 
deism. An example might be the recent challenge to the pledge of allegiance, where the Court 
had already approved exemptions in Barnette. See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 
612 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding school district's policy of requiring teachers to lead pledge of 
allegiance unconstitutional in light of 1954 amendments to the pledge statute). 
452 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 725-26 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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religious symbol in situations like those in Lynch or Allegheny can 
ever be constitutional, because by their very nature, such postings 
reinforce the religion(s) whose symbols are posted. This is not 
meant to minimize the potential conclusion, under the endorsement 
test, that the posting of such symbols may reinforce those whose 
faith is favored or alienate those whose faith is left out.453 It simply 
acknowledges that such feelings are the likely by-product of 
government engaging in actions that support a specific religion or 
religions. It is the support that violates the facilitation test, not the 
response of those who view the support (most likely judges 
attempting to apply the perspective of a hypothetical reasonable 
observer),'54 to the extent the two can be detached. 
One final note here. This section does not address the private 
posting of religious symbols on government property when that 
property is a traditional or limited public forum. That issue would 
be dealt with under the facilitation test in a manner consistent with 
the equal access situations addressed in the next section. 
F. EQUAL ACCESS 
If organized school prayer is the activity most obviously 
prohibited under the facilitation test, equal access to generally 
available government fora is the situation most obviously allowed: 
in fact, it is mandated. When government opens a forum to general 
access by a variety of groups, it cannot keep religious groups from 
accessing that forum. To do so would discourage religion by putting 
religious groups at a disadvantage when compared to other non-
government affiliated groupS.455 So long as a forum really is open to 
all groups which are able to use that forum, consistent with 
453 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597-98, 601-02, 605, 612-13; id. at 625-27 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 650-51 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
454 See March D. Coleman, Comment, The Angel Tree Project, 58 U. Pm. L. REV. 475, 505 
(1997) ("Reasoned elaboration does little to ensure consistency under a standard governed by 
the 'reasonable observer;' one judge may see an endorsement when another judge sees 
neutrality. "). 
4515 See Good News Club v. Milford, 533 U.S. 98, 108-109, 118-20 (2001) (stating content 
or viewpoint discrimination, or both, occurs when religious groups are denied access to public 
or limited public forums). 
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reasonable and generally applicable use guidelines, allowing a 
religious group to meet there does not substantially facilitate 
religion as compared to non-religion. In fact, denying the religious 
group equal access puts that group at a disadvantage when 
compared to other groups. '56 The same would be true of equal 
access to a public forum for expressive purposes.'57 
This is something of a balancing act. One could argue that 
opening such fora to religious groups does give them a substantial 
benefit, even ifit does not do so in a fashion that is disproportionate 
to non-religious groupS.'58 Yet this benefit, which probably would 
not meet the substantiality test in many situations, must be 
balanced against the discouragement that would occur if such 
groups were denied access on an equal basis.'59 When these 
concerns are balanced, providing equal access is more consistent 
with the facilitation test than denying access. Still, if a government 
entity administered an access policy in a manner that favored 
religion over non-religion, or a specific religion over others, that 
policy would be unconstitutional as applied. 
G. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
A detailed discussion of the Free Exercise Clause is beyond the 
scope of this Article. Yet, as has been seen, it is hard to avoid the 
Free Exercise Clause when dealing with principles such as 
neutrality and religious liberty. Moreover, one need not be an 
advocate of a totally unified approach to the religion clauses to 
understand that one cannot overlook Free Exercise Clause concerns 
when framing a test or exploring a principle under the 
Establishment Clause. This section will briefly address the 
implications of the facilitation test under the Free Exercise Clause . 
• 56 This is consistent with aspects of the Court's approach in Good News Club, 533 U.S. 
at 98 and Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 385 (1993). 
~7 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,770 (1995) (holding 
private religious expression on government property does not violate Establishment Clause 
where it occurs in traditional public forum). 
~ See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 137-39 (Souter, J., dissenting) . 
.s9 1d. at 118-20. 
HeinOnline -- 38 Ga. L. Rev. 572 2003-2004
572 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:489 
As will be seen, the test need not be substantially modified to fit 
that context. 
The major issue in the free exercise context is exemptions to 
generally applicable laws. To the extent that government 
intentionally discriminates against a specific religion or religions, 
the test is automatically violated because such targeting 
substantially discourages religion. This is generally consistent with 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye. 460 On the more contentious issue 
of exemptions to generally applicable laws, there is a tension within 
the facilitation test that is not all that different from that which has 
arisen under other religion clause tests-the tension between 
government action that interferes with religious practice 
(discouraging religion under the facilitation test), and exemptions 
(which might encourage religious practice under that test). 
The facilitation test would mandate exemptions unless the 
government demonstrates a compelling government interest for not 
providing an exemption. Because the test is concerned with effects, 
the impact of a generally applicable law on religious practice would 
be taken seriously, since the effect of the law would be different as 
between the burdened religion and other religions and nonbelievers. 
Formal neutrality would preclude the exemption, thus discouraging 
the religious practice of the burdened religion.461 Mandating an 
exemption would remove an impediment to the burdened religion 
and make the impact of the law more balanced between the 
potentially burdened religion and other religions. This is also 
supportable under an equality approach, but not formal equality.462 
When exemptions are viewed in light of the burden a law places 
on the exempted religion, the encouragement an exemption provides 
is balanced against the discouragement resulting from failure to 
provide an exemption. When a "generally applicable law" 
substantially burdens a religious practice, the resulting 
discouragement is presumed to outweigh any encouragement. The 
government still has the opportunity to demonstrate a compelling 
460 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
461 See generally Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
482 See generally Brownstein, supra note 13 (advocating equality); Eisgruber & Sager, 
supra note 41 (advocating equality approach). 
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governmental interest and may be able to do SO.463 Needless to say, 
the preceding is a vastly oversimplified discussion, and it would 
require at least an entire article to analyze the numerous factors 
that are relevant to the Free Exercise Clause analysis. 
v. CONCLUSION 
This Article has set forth the inherent problems with the 
principle of neutrality in Establishment Clause cases. The principle 
sounds good in theory, but there is no neutral baseline from which 
we can gauge claims of neutrality. Thus, neutrality is an empty 
concept. Yet the Court has been increasingly gravitating toward 
neutrality, specifically formal neutrality, as the centerpiece of its 
Establishment Clause doctrine. While this shift has not taken place 
in every context to which the Establishment Clause can be applied, 
it has become dominant in government aid and equal access cases. 
This move is dangerous, not because of its results, but because the 
Court has gone from using neutrality as a broad and vague principle 
that needs other principles such as separation or accommodation in 
order to function, to using it as both the means and ends of 
Establishment Clause analysis. It is deeply troubling that the Court 
has placed such great weight on such weak footing. 
As an alternative to the neutrality principle, this Article 
recommends looking beneath broad principles to narrower ones, 
which may be applied separately or in tandem to issues under the 
Establishment Clause. Relying on Douglas Laycock's concept of 
substantive neutrality, divorced from any claim to neutrality, this 
Article has proposed a test that is focused upon whether government 
activity facilitates or discourages religion. The test is not formalistic 
like the current Court's formal neutrality approach, but it is better 
able to address the highly complex and contextually bound issues 
that arise under the Establishment Clause. 
463 This was Justice O'Connor's position in Smith. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 899-900 
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing government would still have 
opportunities to demonstrate compelling governmental interest). 
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